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AND DEATH SHALL HA VE NO DOMINION: * HOW TO 
ACHIEVE THE CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION OF 
MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS FROM 
EXECUTION 
J. Amy Dillard ** 
'1DJoes the system accurately and consistently determine which 
defendants 'deserve' to die?" 
-Justice Harry Blackmun *** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States handed 
down its opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, exempting mentally re-
tarded capital defendants from execution,l the American Bar As-
sociation ("ABA") issued two legislative options for states to adopt 
in order to comply with the directive of Atkins.2 Alternative A rec-
* DYLAN THOMAS, ANn DEATH SHALL HAVE No DOMINION (1937), reprinted in THE 
POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 4~50 (Daniel Jones ed., 1971). 
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., Washing-
ton and Lee University Law School; B.A., Wellesley College. 
This article arises from my past and current work as a capital defender. I could never 
have imagined or written this piece without the guiding hand of Professor Roger Groot. I 
have missed him at every step in the execution of this piece. I lift up my many thanks to 
him. Professor Penelope Pether's thoughtful contributions, particularly in the early stage 
of this work, were invaluable. I thank the Southeastern Association of Law Schools for ac-
cepting this paper in its junior scholars program and Professor Arnold Loewy for his valu-
able comments; Dean Phil Closius and the University of Baltimore for supporting this 
scholarship; my colleagues, Professors Dionne Koller, Nancy Modesitt, Kimberly Brown, 
and Margaret Johnson for their dedicated thinking about criminal law, which is well out-
side of their bailiwick; and Karen Woody. 
*** Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from deni-
al of certiorari). 
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
2. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legis-
lative Issues, MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 11, 16-17; see 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 ('"[W]e leave to the Staters) the task of developing appropriate 
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their) execution of sentences."' (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,416-17 (1986»). 
961 
962 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:961 
ommended that, upon notice from defense counsel that she had a 
good faith belief that her capital client was mentally retarded, the 
trial judge should conduct a pretrial hearing to determine if the 
defendant is mentally retarded and, thus, not death-eligible.3 Al-
ternative B recommended that, upon notice from defense counsel 
that she had a good faith belief that her capital client was men-
tally retarded, the judge should empanel a jury for the sole pur-
pose of determining if the defendant is mentally retarded and, 
thus, not death-eligible.4 By adopting either option, the mental 
retardation assessment would be kept away5 from the death-
qualified juror,6 who might be inclined to ignore the core values of 
the criminal justice system and, more narrowly, the rationale in 
Atkins.7 With either ABA-suggested procedure, the trial court 
could assure due process for the mentally retarded capital defen-
dant. 
The Virginia General Assembly actively rejected these reason-
able recommendations from the ABA in favor of continuing to en-
trust the death-qualified jury with the mental retardation deter-
mination, effectively employing the same process that resulted in 
Daryl Atkins's original death sentence.S Virginia's post-Atkins 
3. Ellis, supra note 2, at 17. 
4. Id. 
5. I use the phrase "kept away" on purpose. Years of practice as a capital defender 
inform my opinion about the bias of death-qualified jurors, and scholars have doubts about 
the citizenry's ability to delve, unbiased, into a life or death assessment after hearing the 
evidence of guilt. See SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE 
DEATH PENALTY 177 (2005). In the abstract, I would put the question of determining men-
tal retardation to the person or group best able to contemplate the objective facts that 
might support a finding of mental retardation, but I am more inclined to rely on the ability 
of the death-qualified judge to set aside his personal views and render an untainted or pre-
tainted determination on mental retardation. While this article does not purport to engage 
with the extensive writings of John Rawls, I will note that I am, expressly, afraid of 
Rawls's "public sense of justice" because it could ignore the Eighth Amendment interpreta-
tion in Atkins. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 496-504 (1971). 
6. For a discussion of "death-qualified" juries, see Lockhart u. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 
173 (1986); Wainwright u. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985); and Witherspoon u. fllinois, 391 
U.S. 510, 518 (1968). In order to sit on a capital jury panel, a potential juror must demon-
strate that he is willing to sentence the defendant to death. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 
n.21. Those jury candidates who express a categorical opposition to the death penalty are 
ineligible to sit on a capital jury panel. [d. The voir dire process used in selecting jurors for 
a capital trial is sometimes referred to as "death-qualifying" or "Witherspoon-ing" the jury 
panel. For more on the biases of the typical death-qualified juror, see infra Part IV. 
7. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002) (offering two rationales for its de-
cision to exempt). 
8. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2010) ("Facts in mitigation [of 
the offense] may include ... at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capaci-
ty of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
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method for determining mental retardation has not been re-
viewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, but Atkins's 
own journey through the capital punishment maze offers an ex-
ample of the flaws in Virginia's procedure. Three different death-
qualified jury9 panels sentenced Daryl Atkins to death.!O The first 
apparently disregarded the testimony that Atkins was "mildly 
mentally retarded" and the instruction that such evidence should 
be treated as a mitigating factor in the sentencing. ll At the first 
resentencing, after a reversal from the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia,12 a new jury panel heard more complete and detailed evidence 
from Dr. Evan Nelson, who concluded that Atkins's full-scale IQ 
was fifty-nine, making him one of only two capital defendants out 
of over forty that he had tested, who qualified as mentally re-
tarded. 13 In this resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth offered 
expert testimony from Stanton Samenow, who, without adminis-
tering an intelligence test, concluded that Atkins was of "average 
intelligence, at least."14 The second jury panel reconciled the con-
the requirements of law was significantly impaired."). The Virginia General Assembly did 
add a statute explaining how the capital jury should assess the evidence of mental retar-
dation, but it did not require the capital jury to make that determination independently 
from the overall mitigation assessment required by Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4. See 
generally id. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010). When read together, the two statutes 
imply that a fmding of mental retardation could be viewed by the jury as a mere mitigator 
rather than as a "categorical exemption" to a death sentence. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-
16. 
9. For a discussion of death-qualified juries, see supra note 6. 
10. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 2000) (discussing the first 
two juries to sentence Atkins to death); Bill Geroux, Death-Row Inmate Isn't Retarded, A 
Jury Rules, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 6, 2005, at Al (discussing the third jury to 
sentence Atkins to death). Atkins's predecessor as the named defendant in the mental re-
tardation and capital punishment debate, Johnny Paul Penry, has also been sentenced to 
death three times, by three different death-qualified jury panels. See Mike Tolson, An End 
to a Legal Saga, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2008, at Bl. Each of those juries ignored mitigat-
ing evidence that Penry's IQ was below seventy and that he had the intellectual function-
ing of a seven-year-old. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 302 (1989); Tolson, supra. Like 
Atkins, Penry's life has been spared; though no death-qualified jury panel has ever spared 
his life, prosecutors agreed to a plea that resulted in Penry's life sentence. Tolson, supra. 
11. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445,451-52 (Va. 1999). 
12. Id. at 456-57 (reversing the penalty phase because the trial court used a mislead-
ing verdict form). 
13. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5. ("[Atkins1 full scale IQ is 59. Compared to the 
population at large, that means less than one percentile .... Mental retardation is a rela-
tively rare thing. It's about one percent of the population."). 
14. Id. at 309 & n.6. Dr. Stanton Samenow has played an interesting role in capital 
prosecutions in Virginia, having been responsible for evaluating Percy Walton, whose 
death sentenced was commuted by Governor Tim Kaine after he found him mentally in-
competent to be put to death. See Walton v. Johnson, 269 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (W.D. Va. 
2003); Jerry Markon, Va. Governor Commutes Death Sentence, WASH. POST, June 10, 
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flicting testimony again, apparently disregarding the compelling 
evidence offered by the defense, and sentenced Atkins to death. 15 
Even after Atkins's case was returned to a jury panel for a 
third sentencing hearing-after the Supreme Court of the United 
States found that execution of a mentally retarded defendant vi-
olates the Eighth Amendmentl6-the third jury also apparently 
disregarded both the evidence of mental retardation and the jury 
instruction that a mentally retarded defendant should be categor-
ically exempt from a death sentence, and sentenced Atkins to 
death. 17 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded 
the case for a new sentencing hearing because of procedural flaws 
that resulted in the death-qualified jury finding that Atkins had 
failed to establish "significantly subaverage intellectual function-
ing" and "significant limitations in adaptive behavior."18 This de-
cision by the Supreme Court of Virginia did not reach review by 
the Supreme Court of the United States due to a finding of prose-
cutorial misconduct that spared Atkins's life. 19 
2008, at Bl. 
15. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to "commute 
Atkins' sentence of death to life imprisonment merely because of his IQ score," thus ac-
knowledging that the testimony from Evan Nelson-that Atkins had an IQ of fifty-nine, 
well within the range for a diagnosis of mental retardation-was credible. Atkins v. Com-
monwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000). The dissent was more explicit in its wholesale 
rejection of the Commonwealth's evidence, rejecting Stanton "Samenow's opinion that 
[Atkins] possesses average intelligence [as] incredulous as a matter of law," and concluded 
that "the imposition of the sentence of death upon a criminal defendant who has the men-
tal age of a child between the ages of 9 and 12 is excessive." Id. at 323-24 (noting that 
Samenow did not administer an intelligence test). Psychologists have recognized the diffi-
culty in defining mental retardation to satisfy trial courts, emphasizing that using a magic 
number-like seventy-has problems since there is no single IQ test used in the communi-
ty. See generally Paul B. Herbert & Kathryn A. Young, Penry Revisited: Is Execution of a 
Person Who Has Mental Retardation Cruel and Unusual?, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 
282,284 (2002) (discussing the psychiatric standards for "mental retardation"). 
16. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1985». 
17. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 631 S.E.2d 93,95 (Va. 2006). 
18. Id. at 94, 95 & n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010»; 
see also THOMAS WALKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECUTION: THE STORY OF THE DARYL ATKINS 
CASE 243, 259-60 (2009). 
19. See generally Jon Cawley, Prosecutorial Misconduct Case Against York-Poquoson 
Commonwealth's Attorney Moves Forward, DAILY PRESS (Newport News), Mar. 6, 2010, 
http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-03-06/news/dp-Iocal_addison_0306mar06_1_misconduct 
-arkins-and-williams-jones-cathy-krinick (noting that the State Bar's Sixth District Sub-
committee certified the complaints of misconduct to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary 
Board); Jon Cawley, Prosecutor Again Charged with Misconduct, DAILY PRESS (Newport 
News), Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.dailypress.com/news/york -county/dp-nws-york -addison-
20110222,O,2862966.story (noting that Eileen Addison, the prosecutor in the Atkins trial, 
was exonerated of the misconduct charges that led to the commutation of Atkins's death 
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The Atkins saga demonstrates the overworked postconviction 
process in capital cases,20 and this article argues for due process 
protection at the trial level for mentally retarded defendants.21 
Scholars agree that special protections given to capital defen-
dants under the Eighth Amendment are unrealized in practice 
without procedures to guarantee the protections.22 Some argue 
that the Court's use of "the Eighth Amendment as the primary 
vehicle for guaranteeing the heightened reliability of capital pro-
cedures" is conceptually weak. 23 Pursuant to the Court's decision 
to "leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways 
to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of 
sentences,"24 the states have responded with a myriad of proce-
sentence from death to life, but remains under investigation for misconduct in three addi-
tional murder prosecutions); Adam Liptak, Lawyer Reveals Secret, Toppling Death Sen-
tence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at AI. Atkins's life had been spared by the time that it 
took for the final leg in the appellate process to unfold. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 
262-78. Defense counsel was able to continue investigation from the time of Atkins's con-
viction in 1998 through the appellate process, which seemed to be reaching a close in 2006, 
with the remand from the third death sentence. See id. at 260, 278. Atkins suffered three 
death warrants only to have his death sentence commuted to life because of prosecutorial 
misconduct that was discovered over eight years after the first death warrant. Id. at 262-
63, 267. That the revelation of prosecutorial misconduct in Atkins has spared his life ra-
ther than the Court's ignored, near-directive that he be categorically exempted from a 
death sentence based on his obvious mental retardation, represents a travesty wrapped in 
irony. 
20. See Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
329, 368-70 (2010) (describing the postconviction process). Some maintain that the post-
conviction process is flawed by a lack of interest and in-depth review at the appellate level. 
Perhaps the most convincing criticism has come from Justice John Paul Stevens. See Su-
san Estrich et aI., Op-Ed., My Boss, Justice Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2010, at WK11 
(''Years later, I talked about that night with Justice Stevens. He had lost faith in the fair-
ness of the death penalty, because no one paid the kind of attention that he had, and Jus-
tice Stewart had, and Justice Marshall had, that night long ago. When I asked him why he 
had changed, he told me that on this, as on so many questions, he had not changed at all. 
The court had."). 
21. Like Justice John Paul Stevens, the author has little faith in the depth of atten-
tion and review given by appellate courts in capital cases, especially in reviewing facts. 
See Estrich, supra note 20. 
22. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Selling a Quick Fix for Boot Hill: The Myth of 
Justice Delayed in Death Cases, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAw, 
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 148, 163-64 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) (discussing Supreme Court 
habeas corpus jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation 
of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 357-58 (1995). 
23. See Adam Thurschwell, Federal Courts, the Death Penalty, and the Due Process 
Clause: The Original Understanding of the "Heightened Reliability" of Capital Trials, 14 
FED. SENT'G REP. 14, 15 (2001). Thurschwell gives a thorough examination of the flaws of 
the Eighth Amendment approach with an exegesis of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000). Thurschwell, supra, at 15-16. 
24. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
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dures.25 Some states, like Virginia, leave the task of determining 
mental retardation exclusively within the control of the jury,26 
while other states have given the task to the trial judge,27 and 
still others allow for a determination by either the judge or the 
jury.28 Some state legislatures have declined to address the proce-
dure for implementing the Atkins decision at all.29 This article 
contends that trial courts should employ procedures that will 
guarantee that mentally retarded defendants will not be wrongly 
sentenced to death and that any procedure that charges only the 
death-qualified jury with determining whether a defendant is 
mentally retarded is constitutionally flawed. 30 That is, such a pro-
cedure fails to comport with the requirements of due process as 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed 
by the Eighth Amendment.3! 
This article addresses how trial courts should employ proce-
dures to accomplish "heightened reliability"32 in the mental retar-
399, 416-17 (1986» (alterations in original). 
25. For a full view of the states' responses to the Court's directive from Atkins, see 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons From Substance and 
Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 
724-29 (2008). 
26. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(c) (Cum. Supp. 2010). 
27. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(2) (Cum. Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 174.098(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2006). 
28. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c), (e) (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 
701.10b(E), (F) (West Cum. Supp. 2010). 
29. See, e.g., Yeomans v. State, 898 So. 2d 878, 901 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (''The Ala-
bama Legislature has yet to enact a statute to address the holding in Atkins."); State v. 
Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002) (setting forth the procedural guidelines Ohio 
courts should follow in determining whether a defendant facing capital punishment is 
mentally retarded "in the absence of a statutory framework" to make this determination); 
see also Anna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia' An Empty Holding Devoid of Justice for 
the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAw & INEQ. 241, 242 (2009) (noting that "some state legisla-
tures have declined to act on [the mental retardation] issue at all"). Some states, like Mar-
yland, have remained silent in their legislation, yet have left the question of mental retar-
dation with the jury. See Richardson v. State, 598 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
30. For a broad critique of the Court's "shar[ed] constitutional decisionmaking with 
capital sentencing juries, state appellate courts, and state legislatures," see James S. 
Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-
2006,107 COLUM. L. REV. 1,6-7 (2007). 
31. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII, XIV § 1. Atkins hinges the two requirements in a 
new way. See Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 14 ("Since 1972, when the Supreme Court 
suddenly turned to the Eighth Amendment and its 'evolving standards of decency' analysis 
as the primary mode for analyzing the legitimacy of death penalty procedures, historical 
analysis has played little role in the Court's capital jurisprudence." (citing Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 280 (1976»). 
32. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment re-
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dation determination to accomplish the Supreme Court's directive 
for categorical exclusion, and it maintains that if a mentally re-
tarded defendant is subjected to a death sentence, then the 
Atkins directive has been ignored.33 To satisfy the Atkins Court's 
objective of protecting mentally retarded defendants from the 
"special risk of wrongful execution,"34 trial courts should employ a 
unified competency assessment in all capital cases where the de-
fendant asserts mental retardation as a bar to execution. The tri-
al court should employ the in fauorem uitae35 doctrine in its re-
view of the evidence presented at the unified competency 
assessment. A pretrial determination of mental retardation would 
ensure fairness for defendants who may be at special risk "that 
the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may 
call for a less severe penalty."36 
The article proceeds in six parts. Part II will offer an overview 
of the Court's defendant-specific proportionality analysis, found 
in Atkins and Roper u. Simmons,37 and will explore how those cas-
es can be read together to establish a constitutional procedure for 
assessing mental retardation. Part III explains how the applica-
tion of the traditional pretrial competency assessment, required 
by Dusky u. United States,3S would offer an opportunity to assess a 
defendant's competency to face trial where a death sentence is a 
possibility, thus guaranteeing due process to ensure heightened 
reliability in the categorical exemption created by the Atkins 
Court.39 Part IV details the historical categorical exemptions from 
quires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding than would be true in a noncapital 
case." (citations omitted»; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) ("Under the 
Eighth Amendment, the death penalty has been treated differently from all other punish· 
ments." (citation omitted»; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976). 
33. The only way that the categorical exemption against executing the mentally re-
tarded can have any meaning is through a procedure that will heighten the reliability of 
the mental retardation determination. "The fundamental Eighth Amendment question is 
simply whether the individual and crime merit the death penalty, and not whether the 
procedures by which that question is answered are adequate--which is the question asked 
. under the Due Process Clause." Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 16. 
34. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
35. In {avorem vitae means "[i]n favor of life." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 847 (9th ed. 
2009). The doctrine demands that judges construe capital punishment statutes strictly 
and exercise special care with the procedural rights of capital defendants. See MATI'HEW 
HALE, 2 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE [HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN] 305 (1st 
Am. ed. 1736). 
36. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). 
37. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21. 
38. 362 U.S. 402, 402-03 (1960) (per curiam). 
39. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
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a death sentence and how trial courts have applied the doctrine of 
in favorem vitae in capital cases to spare undeserving defendants 
from a death sentence. Part V examines the "two-edged sword" of 
mental retardation,40 and how jurors and prosecutors pose a risk 
of disregarding the Court's directive in Atkins. Part VI concludes 
with a discussion of how, beyond guaranteeing due process, a uni-
fied theory for assessing competency in capital cases would simpl-
ify procedures, reduce costs, and put an end to some extensive 
postconviction litigation like that in Atkins.41 
II. DEFENDANT-SPECIFIC PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS: READING 
ATKINS AND ROPER AS A BODY OF LAW 
In Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme 
Court of the United States declared that execution of a mentally 
retarded or juvenile defendant was unconstitutiona1.42 In the ca-
non of capital punishment jurisprudence, Atkins and Roper are 
proportionality cases; "it is a precept of justice that punishment 
for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] of-
fense."43 As grounds for the new exemptions, the Court relied on 
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, as viewed through the modern common law consti-
tutionalist lens of a majority of the sitting justices,44 and found 
mentally retarded and juvenile defendants "categorically less 
culpable than the average criminal."45 
40. Id. at 321 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989». 
41. Posttrial litigation over the defendant's competency to be executed extends beyond 
the mental retardation question into questions of serious mental illness. See Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957-60 (2007). 
42. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 
(1910». The Court's proportionality review has generally focused on specific crimes. For 
example, the Court has declared that a death sentence cannot be proportionate to crimes 
that do not involve the death of another. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. _, _, 128 
S. Ct. 2641, 2664 (2008) (holding that a death sentence is not proportionate to the crime of 
rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (holding that a death sentence 
is not proportionate to the crime of rape of an adult woman). 
44. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("[O]bjective evidence, though of great importance, [does] 
not 'wholly determine' the controversy, 'for the Constitution contemplates that in the end 
our own judgment will be brought to bear on ... the acceptability of the death penalty un-
der the Eighth Amendment."' (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597». 
45. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). 
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Though the Court declared that mentally retarded and juvenile 
defendants should be "categorically excluded from execution,"46 it 
declined to implement any procedure to ensure categorical exclu-
sion for mentally retarded defendants, anticipating future diffi-
culties "in determining which offenders are in fact retarded."47 A 
comprehensive, close reading of Atkins and Roper reveals that the 
Court employed a unified rule and rationale to reach its conclu-
sion that mentally retarded and juvenile defendants should be ca-
tegorically excluded from execution,48 and as such, trial courts 
would be justified in engaging in similar procedures to ensure 
compliance with the Court's rule.49 
A. Rationales to Support the Categorical Exemption of Mentally 
Retarded Defendants from Execution 
The Court identifies two reasons for exempting mentally re-
tarded defendants from execution: the lack of penological purpose 
in death and the risk of an unfair tria1. 50 Justice Scalia's dissent-
ing opinion offers the best explanation for the former. 51 As sup-
port for the latter, the Court delineates anticipated pretrial prob-
lems, such as susceptibility to give false confessions; trial 
problems, such as an inability to assist counselor serve as a use-
46. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 ("A majority of states have 
rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile[s] ... and we now hold this is re-
quired by the Eighth Amendment."). 
47. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
48. Reading Atkins in the context of Roper is a novel scholarly argument. 
49. Examining the strength of the right to be exempted from the imposition of death 
might influence the type of procedure necessary to guarantee that right. The evidence of 
an evolving standard of decency toward protecting the mentally retarded from execution 
was stronger than the evolving standard of decency toward protecting juveniles from ex-
ecution. The rate of states abolishing the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants 
was moving at a faster clip than the pace of change for juveniles. Between Penry and 
Atkins, sixteen states changed their laws to exempt the mentally retarded from execution. 
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. In contrast, only five states moved to exempt juveniles from 
execution between Stanford v. Kentucky and Roper, the case that overturned Stanford. See 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 565; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). This begs analysis 
of whether the mentally retarded deserve a stronger procedural protection to secure the 
guarantee. Arguably, under the Court's majoritarian, evolving standards of decency anal-
ysis, society is more prepared to categorically exclude mentally retarded defendants from 
execution than it is prepared to exclude juveniles. 
50. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21. 
51. Id. at 337,340-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ful witness for the defense; and sentencing problems, such as a 
jury's disregard for mental retardation as a mitigating factor. 52 
1. Core Values 
The core values of the criminal justice system demand that 
each punishment serve some societal goa1.53 The Supreme Court 
of the United States has embraced two theories of punishment as 
justification for execution: "retribution and deterrence of capital 
crimes by prospective offenders."54 Unless execution "measurably 
contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is nothing more than 
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' 
and hence an unconstitutional punishment."55 For retribution, the 
Court has developed its narrowing jurisprudence by examining 
the nature of the crime to determine whether the defendant had 
committed one of the most serious; for example, the Court has ex-
cluded from the sanction of the death penalty all crimes where 
the victim did not perish. 56 Even among murderers, the Court ex-
cludes from death those crimes that do not reflect "a conscious-
ness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of 
murder."57 Based on the cognitive and rational deficiencies in the 
mentally retarded defendant, the Court has concluded that the 
mentally retarded defendant has lesser culpability, and thus, is 
less deserving of the ultimate sanction than those defendants 
without impairment.58 Because this exclusion is a categorical, ra-
ther than case-by-case, assessment, the Court concluded that no 
person who is mentally retarded will ever be culpable enough to 
deserve death. 59 
52. [d. at 320-21. 
53. The classic theories of punishment are deterrence, retribution, public safety (inca-
pacitation), and education (rehabilitation). See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAw 
AND ITS PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 79 (8th ed. 2007). 
54. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
55. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977». 
56. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. _, _, _, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650, 2665 (2008); 
Coker, 433 U.S. at 598, 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
57. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980). 
58. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002). 
59. [d. I use the vague "to be" here because the Court gives no direction on how a trial 
court should determine if a defendant is mentally retarded, whether the defendant or gov-
ernment should bear the burden of proving or disproving mental retardation, or when this 
determination should be made. In Part III, I begin to unravel the necessary complexities 
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To satisfy a deterrence theory of punishment, the Court has 
looked to see whether the imposition of a death sentence in one 
case will affect "the 'cold calculus that precedes the decision' of 
other potential murderers."6o The Court has concluded that poten-
tial murderers who are mentally retarded lack the capacity to en-
gage in the logical reasoning necessary to connect their impulsive 
conduct with a future punishment of death.61 Moreover, the Court 
has found that potential murderers who are not mentally re-
tarded will experience lesser deterrence from the fact that men-
tally retarded murderers are exempted from the imposition of 
death.62 
The characteristics of mental retardation defined by the Court 
that affect the theory of punishment analysis are relevant to the 
mentally retarded defendant's capacity just before the crime, dur-
ing the crime, and at the time of execution.63 Mental retardation 
operates like "insanity-lite" for the Atkins Court.64 The Court re-
cognizes that some mentally retarded defendants will not be able 
to distinguish right from wrong, the classic element under the 
narrow M'Naghten insanity test.65 But for those mentally re-
tarded defendants who will not meet the M'Naghten standard for 
being found insane at the time of the offense, the symptoms of 
"diminished capacities to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from expe-
rience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to 
to the Court's proclamation that a mentally retarded defendant should be categorically 
exempted from the imposition of the death penalty. 
60. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976». 
61. Id. at 320. 
62. Id. Most critics think that the theory of deterrence is an exercise in theory with no 
practical effect. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader's Companion to Against Predic-
tion: A Reply to Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, 
Selective Incapacitation, Governmentality, and Race, 33 LAw & SOC. INQmRY 265, 272 
(2008). That the Court engages the theory, to seemingly absurd conclusions, secures the 
analysis that the mentally retarded defendant is different enough, based on diagnosis 
alone, to warrant an exemption from the imposition of death no matter how heinous his 
crime. 
63. ABA DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, STATE DEATH 
PENALTY AsSESSMENTS KEy FINDINGS (2007), http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assess 
mentprojectlkeyfindings.pdf. 
64. Since the insanity defense is used rarely (in less than one percent of felony cases) 
and succeeds even less often, it follows that the Court wanted to ease the burden of prov-
ing insanity for mentally retarded defendants. Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Em-
pirical Research on the Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward In-
formed Policy, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 378 (1999). 
65. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719, 723. 
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understand the reactions of others" operate as an exemption from 
the imposition of the death penalty.66 Under theory of punishment 
analysis, the relationship of the symptoms, such as a diminished 
capacity to control impulses, to the exemption from execution, re-
quires the symptom to have affected the mentally retarded defen-
dant's thought process at the time of his crime.67 If he had an ir-
resistible impulse that was the product of mental retardation 
(i.e., untreatable with medication or therapy), then the defendant 
was not able to conform his conduct.68 Thus, retribution for the 
mentally retarded defendant's act is impossible since he is unable 
to reflect on the quality of his act. Moreover, a mentally retarded 
potential capital murderer can neither engage in logical reason-
ing, nor control his irresistible impulse so that he could mull over 
the potential of a death sentence and be deterred from commit-
ting murder. 
But this kind of diminished capacity issue was an available mi-
tigating factor during capital sentencing before Atkins was de-
cided69 and remains available post-Atkins.70 Taking that into ac-
count, under the theory of punishment justification, Atkins may 
serve only to guarantee an additional jury instruction explaining 
that mental retardation must operate as a super-mitigator and 
should not be balanced against other aggravating factors.71 States 
have grappled with how to force death-qualified jurors to honor 
mental retardation as a super-mitigator; some bifurcate the men-
tal retardation determination from the rest of the classic aggrava-
tor-mitigator sentencing determination,72 though most merely of-
66. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
67. See id. ("[T]here is abundant evidence that [the mentally retarded] often act on 
impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan .... "). 
68. See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of the Integrationist Test As a Replacement for 
the Special Defense of Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 523, 524 (2009). 
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2·264.4(B)(vi) (Repl. Vol. 2000) ("Facts in mitigation may 
include ... mental retardation of the defendant."). 
70. See id. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2010) ("Facts in mitigation may include ... 
(iv) at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was significantly impaired .... "). 
71. Cf. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 38, 44 (2004) (reversing the lower court's instruc-
tions directing "the jury to give effect to mitigation evidence" and acknowledging that the 
defendant's low IQ score is relevant mitigation evidence that a jury "might well have con-
sidered ... as a reason to impose a sentence more lenient than death," yet not requiring 
the court to exempt the defendant from the death penalty). 
72. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 727. 
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fer an additional instruction to jurors,73 which arguably gets lost 
in the general aggravator-mitigator balancing act. 
2. Trial Prejudice 
Atkins has a second, often overlooked, justification for "a cate-
gorical rule making such offenders ineligible for the death penal-
ty."74 The Atkins Court found that mentally retarded defendants 
suffered a special risk '''that the death penalty will be imposed in 
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty."'75 The 
Court asserted that "[m]entally retarded defendants may be less 
able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typi-
cally poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwar-
ranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes."76 If a men-
tally retarded defendant is in fact "less able to give meaningful 
assistance to their counsel,"77 then that defendant could be de-
scribed as incompetent to stand trial where a death sentence is a 
possibility. That is, the defendant may be competent to stand tri-
al for capital murder, but not competent to stand trial where the 
possibility of a death sentence looms.78 In short, mental retarda-
tion may serve as a reason for a narrow finding of incompeten-
cy-the incompetency to stand trial for capital murder where 
death is a potential sentence.79 Under this rationale for categori-
73. See Laurie T. Izutsu, Note, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to Capital Defendants with 
Severe Mental fllness, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 995, 1004-05 (2005). 
74. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002). 
75. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978». 
76. Id. at 320-2l. 
77. Id. at 320. 
78. This is a distinction that would be clear to any judge, prosecutor, or defense attor-
ney involved in a capital case, but likely deserves more explanation here. The charge of 
capital murder carries two potential sentences-life or death. The crime of capital murder 
is distinct from other murders in that it usually involves an additional element of proof 
from the government, like the murder of a child or of a police officer. See, e.g., Omar Randi 
Ebeid, Comment, Death by Association: Conspiracy Liability and Capital Punishment in 
Texas, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1831, 1859 & n.201 (2009) (noting that, in Arizona, determining 
whether a crime is punishable by death relies upon a showing of at least one aggravating 
factor, such as the murder of a police officer). Under Atkins, a mentally retarded defendant 
could proceed to trial for capital murder, but, if guilty, could only be sentenced to life in 
prison. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. Criminal attorneys sometimes refer to this as "taking 
death off of the table." For a recent example of a trial judge removing death as a possible 
penalty, see Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., No Death Penalty in Police Slayings, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.charlotteobserver.coml2010/08/2511641648/no-death-
penalty-in-police-slayings.html. 
79. See Joanmarie Daria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 317 (2009) (suggesting that if trial courts focus on the cause of 
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cally excluding mentally retarded capital defendants from a death 
sentence, leaving the job of determining mental retardation to the 
death-qualified jury violates due process.80 
The second justification the Court offers for its categorical rule 
exempting mentally retarded defendants from the imposition of 
death relates to the trial itself; and in this justification, the Court 
has created a new concept. A mentally retarded defendant who 
suffers from "diminished capacities to understand and process in-
formation, to communicate, ... to engage in logical reasoning, ... 
and to understand the reactions of others" will be less able to give 
meaningful assistance to counsel, which will affect the defen-
dant's ability to make a persuasive showing of mitigation, or 
serve as an effective witness, because he may be seen as remorse-
less.81 A logical reading of the Court's concern demands that trial 
courts add a new determination-that of mental retardation-to 
the pretrial competency assessment. If a capital defendant, by 
virtue of his mental retardation, lacks the ability to give mea-
ningful assistance to counsel and help prepare a useful, effective 
mitigation case, then he should not be subjected to a trial wherein 
a death sentence is a possible outcome. The Court acknowledges 
the mentally retarded defendant's inability to have a fair trial be-
cause of his own deficiencies82 and creates a remedy-exemption 
from death. 83 Whether or not a defendant can have a fair trial is a 
due process question for the trial court to tackle. 
incompetency rather than the result of a finding of incompetency, the entire scheme for 
determining competency to stand trial might be transformed). 
80. See supra Part 11.1. (detailing the characteristics of death·qualified jurors and the 
likelihood that they will disregard evidence of mental retardation or ignore court instruc· 
tions that might result in a life sentence). 
81. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 320-21 (footnote omitted). 
82. Id. The Atkins Court seems especially cognizant of the bad impression that a men· 
tally retarded defendant might give to the sentencing jury. 'Trheyj are typically poor wit· 
nesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for 
their crimes." Id. at 321. This concern about the way in which a defendant appears to the 
jury seems to cheapen the whole criminal justice process-particularly where death is a 
potential sentence-for all defendants, not just those with mental retardation. The thea· 
trics of witnesses and lawyers has long been satirized, thus demonstrating the strategic 
planning between client and lawyer to manipulate the jury into empathizing with the de· 
fendant. See CHITA RIVERA, When Velma Takes the Stand, on CHICAGO: ORIGINAL 
SOUNDTRACK (Arista Records 1996) ("When Velma takes the standlLook at little Vel/See 
her give 'em helllWhen she turns it on/Ain't she doing grand/She's got 'em eating out of the 
palm of her hand" and "Then, I thought I'd cry. Buckets. Only I don't have a handker· 
chief-that's when I have to ask for yours! I really like that part. Don't you?"). 
83. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
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B. No Due Process Directive from the Court 
After declaring that mentally retarded capital defendants are 
"categorically less culpable than the average criminal,"84 the 
Court in Atkins recognized the difficult task of "developing appro-
priate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction" of excluding 
mentally retarded defendants from execution.85 Rather than ad-
dressing the issue of how to make a determination of mental re-
tardation, the Court returned the question to the states,86 some of 
which, in turn, have left the question to the jury.87 As Professors 
Carol and Jordan Steiker have written, ''by essentially deregulat-
ing the procedural means of enforcing the substantive right, the 
Court has undermined the goals of the underlying ban by creat-
ing a substantial risk of false negatives."88 Daryl Atkins himself is 
a testament to just how far a death-qualified jury panel will go to 
ignore plain evidence and a trial court's directions.89 
Perhaps because the process of determining a juvenile's age 
seemed easier than determining mental retardation, the Court 
did not address how trial courts should determine the question of 
age in Roper, nor did the Court note that states would need to de-
velop a process for determining the age of a capital defendant.90 
Historically, the determination of whether a defendant's fate was 
to be treated as a juvenile or as an adult has rested with the trial 
court.9l The trial court makes the factual determination of wheth-
er a defendant was younger than eighteen years old at the time of 
84. Id. at 316; cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (employing the same 
rationale for exempting mentally retarded capital defendants and juvenile defendants). 
85. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986». 
86. Id. (quoting Ford, 536 U.S. at 416-17). 
87. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 724-25. Given that the Atkins Court ex-
presses concern that jurors will be less persuaded by evidence of mental retardation in 
light of the presentation of aggravating factors and that jurors will likely turn the mitigat-
ing factor of mental retardation into an aggravating factor showing future dangerousness, 
it is hard to see how any system that allows a jury to weigh mental retardation alongside 
other mitigating and aggravating evidence could comport with due process requirements. 
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-2l. 
88. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 725 (noting, specifically, that leaving the 
mental retardation determination to death-qualified jurors creates a special risk). 
89. The risk of prejudice is most obvious from the fact that some states have created 
procedures that mandate that the mental retardation determination must be made by 
someone who has not been charged with hearing the substantive evidence of guilt and 
making a guilt or innocence decision. See id. at 727; supra Part I. 
90. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,568,572-73,578-79 (2005). 
91. See CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & STUART J. MILLER, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 134 
(6th ed. 2008). 
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the crime before the commencement of any important proceed-
ings.92 This factual determination of age is jurisdictional in that 
this decision necessitates the path and process for each case.93 
Based on the outcome of the trial court's factual determination 
of age, which is likely undisputed by the parties, the defendant 
will find himself either in juvenile court or in adult court.94 In the 
Roper context, the age determination could categorically exclude 
the defendant from death eligibility.95 Because of this clear histor-
ical process for determining age, the Court gave no instruction in 
Roper on how the states should develop appropriate ways to en-
force the constitutional restriction on excluding juveniles from a 
death sentence.96 
The rationale for excluding mentally retarded defendants and 
juvenile defendants from the imposition of a death sentence is the 
same.97 Pursuant to the Court's narrowing jurisprudence,98 ex-
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. I have only seen a dispute over age arise in a collateral, postconviction proceed· 
ing, usually in the context of a deportation hearing. I have seen two cases where a defen· 
dant facing deportation, based on a criminal conviction, filed a corum nobis petition in the 
sentencing court asserting that he was actually a juvenile when he was sentenced as an 
adult. In both cases, the defendant was Ethiopian, and his birth date had been calculated 
according to the Ethiopian calendar, which differs from the Gregorian calendar, used in 
the United States. In U.S. years, the defendant was a juvenile at the time of his offense, 
though according to the Ethiopian birth date listed on his passport, the defendant ap-
peared to be an adult at the time of the offense. For the simplest explanation of the differ-
ent calendars, see Embassy of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Time, http://www.ethiopianembassy. 
org/AboutEthiopialAboutEthiopia.php?Page=Clock.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2011). Need-
less to say, in each case, a judge heard the complex facts and made a determination of the 
defendant's age. 
95. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. The under-eighteen defendant would still proceed to trial 
for capital murder, but if the jury found him guilty, it could only sentence him to life. See 
id. at 559-60. As such, there would be no sentencing phase of the litigation. See supra note 
78. 
96. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
97. I believe that seriously mentally ill defendants and those with significant brain 
injuries could also fall within the rationale that justifies the categorical exemption. There 
are compelling arguments that seriously mentally ill capital defendants-whether at the 
time of the offense or at the time of execution-should be "categorically exempted." See, 
e.g., Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the Death Penalty, 45 Hous. L. 
REV. 1493, 1518-27 (2009) (discussing a categorical bar to executing defendants suffering 
from serious mental disease or defect). 
98. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) ("There is no principled way to 
distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in 
which it was not."). Employing special safeguards to ensure that only the most deserving 
are put to death originated in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia. 408 
U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (''Death is a unique punishment in the 
United States."). The creation of and adherence to the "death-is-different" doctrine has 
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cluding mentally retarded and juvenile defendants from a death 
sentence is appropriate "to ensure that only the most deserving of 
execution are put to death."99 The Court has concluded that men-
tally retarded defendants, like juvenile defendants, have a "dimi-
nished ability to understand and process information."loo This 
theory of deterrence101 in capital sentencing simply does not apply 
to mentally retarded or juvenile defendants because it is "less 
likely that they can process the information of the possibility of 
execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct 
based upon that information."102 But the Court also recognizes 
that the very factors which should be persuasive mitigators to the 
jury-diminished capacity based on mental retardation or 
youth-will likely be disregarded or even viewed as an aggravat-
ing factor by the sentencing jury.103 Given the similar rationales 
for excluding mentally retarded and juvenile defendants from a 
done little to remedy inherent problems in capital prosecutions, such as racial bias. See 
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 398-402 (discussing the "death-is·different" doctrine). 
99. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
100. Id. at 320. 
101. The Court has long focused on deterrence and retribution as the dual justifications 
for capital punishment. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (noting that "it 'is 
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering'" if ex· 
ecution does not contribute to retribution or deterrence (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 592 (1977»); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (noting that "retribution 
and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders" form the central, social purposes 
of the death penalty). The Court has addressed the public safety rationale, in the context 
of the jury's charge to assess the defendant's future dangerousness, and has concluded 
that the jury must know that the defendant's life sentence would be without the possibility 
of parole. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1994). 
102. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. There are compelling arguments that the rationale for not 
executing the mentally retarded or juveniles should apply in all criminal trials, i.e., that 
death is not different. For a detailed critique of the "two-track system," see Rachel Bar-
kow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and 
the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1162, 1186-97, 1205 (2009) ("A uniform 
approach under which all criminal defendants get the same substantive sentencing rights 
under the Eighth Amendment would put the Court's sentencing jurisprudence back into 
the constitutional mainstream."). 
103. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 ("The risk 'that the death penalty will be imposed 
in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty,"' is enhanced ... by the lesser 
ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the 
face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors ... [R)eliance on mental 
retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelih-
ood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury." (quot-
ing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978»); Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 ("An unacceptable 
likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would 
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the ju-
venile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should re-
quire a sentence less severe than death. In some cases a defendant's youth may even be 
counted against him."). 
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death sentence, it follows that trial courts should, procedurally, 
treat the two groups the same way.I04 
C. The Complex Task of Deciding Whether a Defendant is 
Mentally Retarded 
As it had in Ford u. Wainwright,!05 the Court in Atkins left "to 
the Staters] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce 
the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sen-
tences."J06 In Ford, the Court held that a capital defendant who 
alleges incompetency to be executed is entitled to a competency 
evaluation and an evidentiary hearing on the issue; the Court 
upheld the longstanding common law rule that execution of the 
insane violates the Eighth Amendment. lo7 By 2007, the Court had 
to review and reaffirm its holding in Ford, and step into the due 
process breach created by the state of Texas in its attempt to 
create a method to comply with the Court's prohibition on the ex-
ecution of those capital defendants who were insane at the time of 
the scheduled execution.!08 In the twenty-one years between the 
announcement of a new right or protection-that the insane 
should not be executed-and an examination of how trial courts 
might implement procedures to ensure the new right or protec-
tion,lo9 scholars and lawyers lamented the lack of consistent con-
stitutional criminal procedures to ensure due process. 110 As they 
104. For a complete equal protection argument, see Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Un· 
equal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 884-903 (2009) (discussing, in particular, 
how mentally retarded defendants are substantially similar to defendants with traumatic 
brain injury, central nervous system disorders, and other pervasive developmental disord-
ers). Expanding on Farahany's argument, the mentally retarded, juveniles, and her enu-
merated groups all suffer from the same type of diminished capacity, though each stems 
from a different source. Given the Court's reasoning in Atkins and Roper, the source of the 
lack of capacity is not the justification for the new narrowing jurisprudence; rather, the 
Court focuses on the capital defendant's capacity at the time of the crime and at the time 
of the trial and sentencing in "categorically exempting" a new class of people from a death 
sentence. See generally Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with 
Mental fllness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving 
Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental fllness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
785 (2009). 
105. 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986). 
106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17). 
107. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410-11. 
108. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934-35, 954, 956-57 (2007). 
109. Compare Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
execution of the insane), with Panetti, 551 U.S. at 935 (finding that the trial court failed to 
provide adequate procedures). 
110. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 148; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 22. 
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did with the prohibition on executing the insane, state legisla-
tures have grappled with myriad procedures to ensure compliance 
with the Atkins prohibition on executing the mentally retarded. III 
In Atkins, the Court concerned itself with justifying the out-
come, exempting the mentally retarded from execution.l12 In 2002, 
the Court held that societal standards of decency had evolved to a 
place where the execution of a mentally retarded person convicted 
of capital murder would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment.1l3 The majority opi-
nion offers an intense examination of the changes in the way that 
state legislatures dealt with the mental retardation issue in capi-
tal trials during the thirteen years between its decision in Penry 
u. Lynaugh, where the Court explicitly rejected the defendant's 
argument that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution 
of the mentally retarded under the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause,1l4 and its decision in Atkins, which reversed Pe-
nry.l15 The majority justifies the outcome with "evolving stan-
dards of decency" jurisprudence and engages in an examination of 
state legislatures that enacted statutes to exempt the mentally 
retarded from execution between 1989 and 2002,116 In particular, 
the majority relies on the direction of the change, exclusively in 
favor of protecting the mentally retarded from execution, as "po-
werful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded 
111. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 385 n.147 (citing cases in which the court 
has addressed the constitutional adequacy of states' efforts to guide sentencer discretion). 
112. See generally Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-20. I refer to "the mentally retarded defen-
dant" throughout this section. While the Court did not wrestle with the facts to determine 
whether Daryl Atkins was mentally retarded or not, the fact that the Court took up the 
question and created a new exemption from death for mentally retarded defendants based 
on the facts presented about Daryl Atkins makes an inference that the Court found com-
pelling evidence of Daryl Atkins's mental retardation seem appropriate. That the resen-
tencing jury then sentenced Daryl Atkins to death, thereby rejecting his mental retarda-
tion, is the topic of text accompanying notes 9-19, supra. 
113. See id. at 321. 
114. 492 U.S. 302, 328-29, 335 (1989). 
115. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15. 
116. See id. at 304, 313-15. In 1989, at the time of the Penry decision, only two states, 
Georgia and Maryland, had statutes that exempted the mentally retarded from execution. 
See id. at 313-14 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Supp. 1988) and MD. CODE ANN., 
Art. 27, § 412(f)(1) (West 1989». By 2002, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington had joined Georgia, Maryland, and the 
federal government in prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 313-15 (dis-
cussing various state statutes exempting mentally retarded defendants from capital pu-
nishment). 
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offenders as categorically less culpable than the average crimi-
nal."l17 
For all of the detailed attention the Court gives to the progress 
in the states toward exempting the mentally retarded defendant 
from execution, it gives scant attention to defining the condition 
of mental retardation. lls Without adopting the definition of the 
American Association on Mental Retardation, the Court offers, in 
a footnote: 
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present func· 
tioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or 
more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, 
self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, 
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental 
retardation manifests before age 18.119 
The Court identifies by incorporation the work of scholars who 
study mental retardation, characteristics, or symptoms that may 
comprise the diagnosis of mental retardation. 120 Using the clinical 
definition, the Court seems to accept as a threshold that the men-
tally retarded defendant would have "subaverage intellectual 
functioning [and] significant limitations in adaptive skills such as 
communication, self-care, and self-direction," all of which ''became 
manifest before the age of eighteen."121 The Court declares that, 
''by definition [mentally retarded defendants] have diminished 
capacities to understand and process information, to communi-
cate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to en-
gage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand 
117. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist made the compelling argu-
ment that capital jurors were not as evolved as state legislators in their standards of de-
cency since, at the time, experts estimated that ten percent of the inmates on death row 
were mentally retarded. See id. at 324 n. * (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
118. The Court has a long history of shying away from detail in mental illness cases. In 
fact, it often conflates the fundamental principles of competency to stand trial and sanity, 
though this might be a remnant of Blackstone's use of "idiot" to designate both those de-
fendants who lack the competency to stand trial and those defendants who lack the capac-
ity to distinguish right from wrong. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410-11 
(1986) (discussing the Eighth Amendment prohibition on executing the insane yet assess-
ing whether the defendant is entitled to a competency evaluation); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. 715 (1972); see also United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 721-22, 725 (6th Cir. 1968); 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24. 
119. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (quoting AM. AsS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL 
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992». 
120. Id. at 318 nn.23-24. 
121. Id. at 318. 
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the reactions of others."122 Among the social and cognitive defi-
ciencies, the Court finds "abundant evidence that they often act 
on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and 
that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders."123 
Defendants who satisfy the Atkins definition of mental retarda-
tion are ineligible for the death penalty, whether the degree of 
mental retardation is defined as mild, moderate, or severe. 124 The 
specific characteristics of mental retardation become important 
upon examining the Court's two reasons for exempting the men-
tally retarded from the imposition of the death penalty.125 
While the prosecution and the defense might present compet-
ing experts who employ different tests for ascertaining an opinion 
on the defendant's mental retardation, the gap in the kind of evi-
dence that should be considered is quite narrow. For example, 
witness testimony on how the defendant acted at the time of the 
crime is well-accepted evidence to be considered by the jury when 
determining whether the defendant was insane at the time of the 
offense. 126 But evidence of mental retardation should not include 
lay testimony about how the defendant acted at the time of the 
crime. As Justice Scalia notes in his dissenting opinion in Atkins, 
the majority adopted a rule that excludes consideration of moral 
responsibility by exempting all mentally retarded defendants-
from mild to severe-from a death sentence. 127 Circumstantial 
evidence from which a factfinder might ascertain a capital defen-
dant's moral responsibility is, thus, irrelevant to the determina-
tion of mental retardation. 
122. Id. (footnote omitted). 
123. Id. (footnote omitted). 
124. See id. at 321; see also Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of 
Implementing Atkins v. Virginia· How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate As-
sessments and Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 811, 822 (2007) (discussing Justice Scalia's protest against the categorical exclusion 
of those with mild mental retardation from capital punishment). 
125. Some argue that the factual determination of which defendants should be categor-
ically excluded from execution should not be read narrowly. It seems reasonable that the 
trial court should determine which defendants, in the broader sense, satisfy the Atkins 
rationale that supports their exclusion from execution. This article, however, concerns it-
self only with those defendants who would meet the narrow criteria of mental retardation. 
See, e.g., Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting). The 
author, however, agrees with the scholarship in the field that supports the categorical ex-
clusion of other defendants whose execution could not meet the traditional goals of deter-
rence and retribution. See Slobogin, supra note 104, at 293; Winick, supra note 104, at 37. 
126. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1981). 
127. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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III. A UNIFIED THEORY FOR COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT 
Because the Atkins Court expressed a specific concern that 
"[m]entally retarded defendants may be less able to give mea-
ningful assistance to their counsel,"128 trial courts should assess 
mental retardation during a pretrial competency hearing for the 
capital defendant in order to ensure that no Eighth Amendment 
violation makes a mockery of the criminal justice system, by un-
dermining "the strength of the procedural protections that our 
capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards."129 
William Blackstone declared that any man who became mad 
after committing a crime and was unable to make a proper plead-
ing in his defense should not be arraigned.13o Dating back as far 
as medieval English law, a criminal defendant must be mentally 
competent before standing trial. 131 Defendants with mental de-
fects were spared from criminal prosecution.132 No conventional 
theory of punishment justifies the trial and conviction of a defen-
dant not competent to understand the charges against him, the 
nature of the proceedings, or the reasons for his prosecution. 133 
There is very little constitutional common law governing the 
assessment of competency to stand trial for criminal charges. In 
1960, the Supreme Court of the United States set out an explicit 
test for determining a defendant's competency to stand trial in 
Dusky v. United States. 134 The per curiam opinion of less than 250 
words sets out the barest of requirements that trial courts must 
use to determine if a defendant is competent to stand trial. 135 Per 
Dusky, the trial court must ascertain whether the defendant "has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a rea-
sonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him."136 Merely being "oriented to time and place and 
128. Id. at 320. 
129. Id. at 317. 
130. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24; see also J. Amy Dillard, Without Limita-
tion: "Groundhog Day" for Incompetent Defendants, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2007). 
131. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24. 
132. Grant H. Morris et aI., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOus. J. HEALTH L. 
& POL'y 193, 201 (2004). 
133. Dillard, supra note 130, at 1225. 
134. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
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[having] some recollection of events" is insufficient evidence of 
competency.137 The Court's rational and factual understanding 
test, established in Dusky/3s comports with Blackstone's ancient 
rule that the prosecution of a defendant so lacking in the present 
ability to understand the proceedings and charges against him 
cannot satisfy the core values of the criminal justice system. 139 In 
1975, the Court added a fourth consideration for trial courts as-
sessing competency-whether the defendant has the present abil-
ity to assist counsel in preparing a defense. 14o 
As with many of the Court's due process declarations, the me-
thod for conducting a competency evaluation is left to the 
states.l4l The Court has clarified its jurisprudence minimally, re-
quiring an assessment in every case where the evidence raises 
sufficient doubt as to the defendant's competency, though the 
Court has declined to specifically define sufficient doubt.142 Ra-
ther, the Court has enumerated a list of factors for each trial 
court to consider, including the defendant's irrational behavior 
and demeanor in core proceedings, prior medical opinions of a de-
fendant's competency, and concerns raised by defense counsel. 143 
Much has been written about the "rational understanding" 
component of the Dusky competency test. 144 Most of that work ad-
dresses the different levels of competency necessary to stand tri-
al, plead guilty, or waive counsel in favor of self-representation, 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24. 
140. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). 
141. See id. at 173 (discussing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966». 
142. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 
738 (1972) (explaining that incompetent criminal defendants cannot be detained indefi-
nitely when the trial court has determined that there is little hope of restoration to compe-
tency). 
143. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86. 
144. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond 
Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 594 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie, The Compe· 
tence of Criminal Defendants]; Richard J. Bonnie et aI., Decision·Making in Criminal De· 
fense: An Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client Competence, 
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48,53 (1996); E. Lea Johnston, Setting the Standard: A Cri-
tique of Bonnie's Competency Standard and the Potential of Problem-Solving Theory for 
Self-Representation at Trial, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1605, 1617-18 (2010) (footnote omit-
ted); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding," and the Crimi-
nal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2006); Bruce J. Winick, Reforming In-
competency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to 
Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571,618-19 (1995) (citing Dusky v. Unit-
ed States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960». 
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and the theories that support abolition of competency hearings 
when it is not in the best interest of the defendant to be relegated 
to the mental health system. 14S It is fair to say that most scholars 
focus on the defendant's interest in the competency hearing and 
finding, while paying little attention to the societal interest at 
stake in the competency determination. 146 
The ability to assist counsel in preparing an adequate defense 
operates as a lifeline in capital litigationY7 Because of the com-
plexity of all capital litigation, defendants rely on their attorneys 
for making critical decisions, and whether consciously or not, at-
torneys engage in surrogate decisionmaking. 148 An of ten-
overlooked factor in the competency determination is the serious-
ness and complexity of the charges;149 that is, trial courts cannot 
employ a fixed standard for determining competency, but must 
rather examine each defendant in the context of his own trial to 
see if he is able to assist counsel. 150 Nowhere is this demand more 
pressing than in a capital case. 151 
145. See Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 144, at 542, 554; 
Johnston, supra note 144, at 1610, 1614, 1624; Maroney, supra note 144, at 1380-84; Wi-
nick, supra note 144, at 622. Professor Richard J. Bonnie is responsible for establishing a 
cohesive theory for competency for criminal defendants, and much of the scholarship in 
the area operates as a response to his seminal work. See Bonnie, The Competence of Crim-
inal Defendants, supra note 144. 
146. Professor Bonnie elaborates on the societal interests, such as preserving the moral 
dignity of the process by prohibiting the prosecution and conviction of incompetent defen-
dants who neither understand the nature of the wrongdoing nor the punishment thereof. 
Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 144. 
147. See Christopher Seeds, The Afterlife of Ford and Panetti' Execution Competence 
and the Capacity to Assist Counsel, 53 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 309, 314, 346-47 (2009) (quoting 
Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Panetti v. Quar-
terman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 06-6407». 
148. See Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 144, at 546-47. 
Surrogate decisionmaking covers only those narrow aspects of the litigation reserved for 
the defendant's decision-being tried by a judge or a jury and testifying or remaining si-
lent. [d. This article maintains that, for a capital defendant to assist counsel in the prepa-
ration of an adequate defense, the capital defendant needs to engage in other collaborative 
decisionmaking-such as how to present mitigation evidence, how to characterize mental 
illness, and the mental retardation determination-in order to have a fair trial that satis-
fies the societal goals of capital punishment. 
149. See 7 THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC AsSESSMENTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS 76-77 (1986). 
150. [d. at 77. 
151. The best evidence of the increased need for expertise and high-level functioning 
comes through the states' decisions to require that capital defenders have more experience 
and training than other criminal defenders. It follows that if counsel needs to have a more 
refined ability to handle the complexity of the capital trial, so too must the capital defen-
dant. See Michael D. Moore, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination and 
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The Atkins Court ultimately rested its holding on its tradition-
al narrowing jurisprudence-"to ensure that only the most de-
serving of execution are put to death"-and excludes the mentally 
retarded from execution. 152 But the mere imposition of a death 
sentence upon a mentally retarded defendant also constitutes an 
Eighth Amendment violation under the Court's second ratio-
nale. 153 Because of the reduced capacity of the mentally retarded 
capital defendant, the Court establishes a "categorical rule mak-
ing such offenders ineligible for the death penalty."154 The Court 
worries that, all factors to the contrary, the death-qualified jury 
panel will sentence the mentally retarded capital defendant to 
death. 155 To achieve the goal of ineligible defendants avoiding a 
sentence of death, trial courts should assess death-eligibility at 
the time of the pretrial competency assessment.156 
Even in a pretrial competency assessment, how and whether 
trial courts would determine a defendant's mental retardation 
would still be a complicated procedure that may be full of conflict-
ing testimony and arguments about what constitutes mental re-
Analysis of State Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to Death-Eligible Defen-
dants, 37 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1617, 1640 (1996); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: 
Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 
329, 357-58 (1995). 
152. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
153. Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986». The Atkins 
Court held that mentally retarded defendants may lack the ability to assist at trial where 
a death sentence is a possibility. Id. at 320-21. Forcing a mentally retarded defendant to 
participate in such a trial, both through the guilt or innocence and sentencing phases, 
would violate the core principle of Atkins. 
154. Id. at 320. 
155. Id. at 320-21. It is hard to determine if the Court's concern is sociological or le-
gal-i.e., will the death-qualified jury panel improperly ignore or weigh credible evidence 
of mental retardation, or will the death-qualified jury panel simply be unable to empathize 
with the mentally retarded defendant and will thus nullify the mental retardation instruc-
tion? In either case, it seems clear that the Court is concerned with the death-qualified 
juror's ability to listen to the evidence and make an individualized determination as re-
quired by Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105 (1982) (requiring "individualized con-
sideration of mitigating factors ... required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments" 
(quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978»). 
156. For an example of the risk of mentally retarded defendants being sentenced to 
death, one need only reexamine the years of trials and appeals for both Daryl Atkins and 
Johnny Paul Penry. See supra notes 10, 19. While the Atkins Court concerns itself with 
trial level obstacles for the mentally retarded defendant, the mentally retarded defendant 
is even more incapable of assisting counsel during an appellate and postconviction process, 
both of which are, arguably, more complex than trial level capital defense. For an excellent 
exposition on expanding and reconceptualizing competency determinations to include the 
appellate and postconviction process, see Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: 
An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 259, 263, 307 (2009). 
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tardation. 157 But because the Court created a constitutional rule 
that turns on a purely clinical diagnosis of mental retardation,158 
it is easy to see the determination as a question of law-the typi-
cal province of the trial judge-rather than as a question of fact. 
While scholars have criticized the Court's decision to draw such a 
bright-line prohibition against executing any person with a men-
tal retardation diagnosis,159 the question is clearly not one to be 
mixed with demeanor facts, as the insanity determination is.160 
IV. HEIGHTENED RELIABILITY: ACHIEVING DUE PROCESS IN THE 
MENTAL RETARDATION DETERMINATION 
Today's decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-
different jurisprudence. Not only does it, like all of that jurispru-
dence, find no support in text or history of the Eighth Amendment; it 
does not even have support in current social attitudes regarding the 
conditions that render an otherwise just death penalty inappro-
priate. 161 
157. See, e.g., John H. Blume et a!., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations From Clinical Defi-
nitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 689, 
695-97 (2009) (discussing the difficulty courts have in adhering to standard requirements 
of the various definitions of mental retardation). Like determining competency to stand 
trial more generally, trial courts would have the task of assessing complex medical testi-
mony. See Davoli, supra note 79, at 345-46. As there is a push among academics to per-
suade trial courts to use a broader, more medically appropriate method for assessing com-
petency, see, for example, id. at 321, 330, so too is there a push for trial courts to employ a 
broader, more meaningful interpretation of "mental retardation," such as creating a cate-
gorical exemption from a death sentence. See Batey, supra note 97, at 1519; Farahany, 
supra note 104, at 903-04. 
158. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 124, at 813. 
159. See id. at 814. Professor Bonnie is the dominant critic of employing a "statistical 
construct" as a categorical bar to execution. See id. This critique makes sense to any crim-
inallaw scholar, since issues of mental health are routinely examined in the context of the 
defendant's capacity to form mens rea. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987). 
Placing the mental retardation determination with the rest of the competency assessment 
in the capital case should settle this discomfort with the "statistical construct." In Atkins, 
arguably, the Court purposefully chose to exempt mentally retarded defendants-and not 
others who suffer mental illness or impairment that make them less culpable-from death 
because, like being a juvenile, the clinical determination of mental retardation is fairly 
simple; hence, the Court adopted the clinical definition of mental retardation. See Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 318. But in adopting a clear method, the Court escaped the "mild, moderate, 
and severe" argument offered by Justice Scalia, and presumably, did not want jurors to 
agree with Justice Scalia that mild mental retardation does not impair a defendant suffi-
ciently to exempt him from a death sentence. Jd. at 338-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's 
mere recitation of the facts makes his point that, in his mind, the facts should matter and 
no one should be categorically excluded from death. See id. at 338. 
160. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 745, 749-53 (2005) (demonstrating the 
Court's acceptance of Arizona's use of demeanor facts to determine insanity). 
161. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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In the opening lines of his dissenting opinion in Atkins, Justice 
Scalia condemns the "evolving standards of decency"162 rationale 
supporting the majority's declaration that the execution of men-
tally retarded defendants would abridge the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."I63 Original-
ists have voiced complaints over "evolving standards of decency" 
as a justification for the living Constitution for decades. l64 But 
even as Scalia rebukes the majority's Eighth Amendment juri-
sprudence, he obliquely embraces centuries of criminal law juri-
sprudence that could likewise justify a procedure that could 
heighten reliability in the trial court's mental retardation deter-
mination and spare mentally retarded defendants from receiving 
a death sentence.165 
The Eighth Amendment is the driving force in the capital juri-
sprudence developed by appellate and postconviction courts, 
which examine the capital defendant's claims after he has been 
found guilty and sentenced to death. Appellate and postconviction 
courts review the substantive fairness of a death sentence pur-
suant to the Eighth Amendment. 166 Due Process Clause review, 
where the court focuses on the procedure used by the trial court 
to protect the capital defendant's substantive rights,167 such as the 
162. Id. at 341-42 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958». 
163. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
164. It is easy to categorize that originalists prefer historical due process over evolving 
standards of decency but the two are not mutually exclusive. When the Court applied 
evolving standards of decency in the death context, it did not explicitly reject historical 
due process, but critics could argue that the net result may well have become an over-
reliance on evolving standards of decency to limit the number of defendants who receive a 
death sentence. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-08 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976); Steven G. Calabresi, 
The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 
667-68 (2006). 
165. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
166. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431-32 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissent· 
ing) ("This Court has ruled that punishment is excessive and unconstitutional if it is 'noth-
ing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' or if it is 
'grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.' It has held that death is an exces-
sive punishment for rape, and for mere participation in a robbery during which a killing 
takes place." (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977))); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
167. Whether a mentally retarded capital defendant has a substantive due process 
right to be free from receiving a death sentence is the subject of the author's work-in-
progress. An exceedingly oversimplified approach to the inquiry requires a determination 
of whether the Eighth Amendment violation of sentencing a mentally retarded defendant 
to death can be remedied by appellate review. In that article, the author maintains that, 
when a mentally retarded defendant or a juvenile receives a death sentence, a substantive 
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right of mentally retarded defendants to be categorically ex-
empted from death, is rare. 16B But due process review, in the ha-
beas or appellate context, will always have flaws. 169 On appellate 
or habeas review, the defendant stands convicted and sentenced 
to death, and in the Atkins context, presumed to be free from 
mental retardation that would categorically exempt him from a 
death sentence.170 
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Atkins offers an overview 
of the treatment of mentally retarded defendants, known as 
"idiots" at the time of the drafting of the Eighth Amendment.171 In 
1791, "'idiots' enjoyed ... special status under the law at that 
time. They, like lunatics, suffered a 'deficiency in will' rendering 
them unable to tell right from wrong."172 Justice Scalia's primary 
objection to the majority opinion in Atkins is that the "idiots" of 
yesterday would be only the severely or profoundly mentally re-
tarded today.173 He objects to the "evolving standards of decency," 
which would give mildly mentally retarded defendants the same 
"special status under the law" enjoyed historically by only the 
most severely mentally retarded defendants. 174 But his history 
lesson offers a glimpse at historical due process employed by 
due process violation has occurred. Moreover, the work·in·progress asserts that, under the 
Court's second rationale in Atkins, forcing a mentally retarded defendant to participate in 
a capital trial where death is a potential sentence constitutes a substantive due process 
violation. For general overview of the debate over substantive and procedural due process 
claims, see, for example, Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due 
Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (2003). 
168. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 16 (discussing the dominance of Eighth Amend-
ment analysis and the Court's "flirting" with the due process jurisprudence); see also 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (finding that a death sentence based on secret 
evidence violates due process). 
169. A good example of the debate over the flaws in the process employed during appel-
late and habeas review appears in the statement of Justice Stevens in the denial of the 
petition of certiorari in Walker v. Georgia, 555 U.S. _, _, 129 S. Ct. 453, 457 (2008) 
("And the likely result of such a truncated (proportionality] review ... is the arbitrary or 
discriminatory imposition of death sentences in contravention of the Eighth Amend-
ment."). If we know that appellate and habeas review will likely be "truncated," then need 
for trial procedures that guarantee due process becomes increasingly important. 
170. See Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 17. ("[Tlhe Supreme Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, consistent with the federal courts' exclusively post hoc perspective in 
the post-Furman era, looks primarily to the substantive merits of the punishment and not 
to its procedural regularity."). 
171. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
172. [d. (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24). 
173. [d. 
174. [d. at 340-41. 
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courts to sort the "idiots" who should be spared from death from 
those who were fit to be executed.175 
This section accepts the majority view in Atkins that mentally 
retarded defendants-whether mild or severe-should be categor-
ically exempted from execution,176 and it looks to Justice Scalia's 
dissenting opinion and to legal history to see how courts have ac-
complished categorical exemption in the past by tracing the de-
velopment, use, and evolution of in favorem vitae, a doctrine 
meaning "in favor of life."I77 The doctrine in its original form de-
manded rigid adherence to technical formalities and strict statu-
tory interpretation in capital casesYS This section will explore 
how the doctrine offers a glimpse at historical due process 
through the heightened use of judicial discretion where death was 
a possible penalty.179 In the most obvious sense, in favorem vitae 
might be seen as an argument for a presumption of life, though 
the Court has never accepted that argument in the capital con-
text.ISO 
175. Id. at 340 ("Due to their incompetence, idiots were 'excuse[d] from the guilt, and of 
course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of 
the senses.' Instead, they were often committed to civil confinement or made wards of the 
State, thereby preventing them from goring] loose, to the terror of the king's subjects." 
(quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *25, and citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302,331 (1989»); SAMUELJANBRAKELETAL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 11-
14 (3d ed. 1985); 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 35, at 33. 
176. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21 (majority opinion). 
177. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 35, at 847; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 339-
54 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 15, 17-19. 
178. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 17. 
179. The Court has long espoused the need for ''heightened reliability" in capital trials, 
both at the guilt or innocence and sentencing phases. Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 
(1993) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding 
than would be true in a noncapital case."); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 455 
(1984) (discussing the reliability the Court demands in capital cases); Thurschwell, supra 
note 23, at 15. 
180. See Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a Due 
Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351, 360-64 (1984). The Court has 
never confronted whether trial courts should adopt a "presumption of life" approach when 
making the mental retardation determination. The argument for a presumption of life in 
capital litigation began with the publication of Beth S. Brinkmann's note in the Yale Law 
Journal in 1984. While state sentencing schemes that reflect a presumption of death are 
unconstitutional, the Court has imposed no requirement that states employ sentencing 
schemes that require a presumption of life. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-81 
(2006). Courts have determined that defendants are entitled to jury determination of fac-
tors that will increase punishment, whether in terms of years or a death sentence. See 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 477 (2000). 
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This section maintains that trial courts should ensure due 
process at the mental retardation determination in all capital 
murder prosecutions. Through an examination of how trial courts 
have historically protected the core values of the criminal justice 
system,181 this section extends a modern application of the in la-
vorem vitae doctrinel82 as it could be used by trial courts in capital 
cases to ensure fair application of the Atkins protections for men-
tally retarded defendants. 
A. The Origin olIn Favorem Vitae 
Death, it turns out, has always been "different," even before the 
Founding-not as a matter of the Eighth Amendment's post hoc con-
cern with the justice of the ultimate punishment imposed, but as a 
matter of the due process concern with the justice of the procedures 
afforded to a defendant who might suffer the ultimate punishment at 
the hands of the state. 183 
Although many capital defendants were convicted in eighteenth-
century England,184 scholars estimate that in reality only approx-
imately half of the convicts were executed. 185 This phenomenon 
can be credited to a combination of pardons by the crown,186 and 
more pertinent here, the use of in lavorem vitae by judges.187 
When confronted with capital statutes that expressly removed 
181. One modern expression of a core value of the criminal justice system is the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII. Another core value, post-Atkins, is that mentally retarded defendants are categori· 
cally exempted from death. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. _, _, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 
2650-51 (2008). 
182. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 15 ("Death, it turns out, has always been 'differ· 
ent,' even before the Founding-not as a matter of the Eighth Amendment's post hoc con-
cern with the justice of the ultimate punishment imposed, but as a matter of due process 
concern with the justice of the procedures afforded to a defendant who might suffer the 
ultimate punishment at the hands of the state."). For a discussion of in favorem vitae, see 
supra note 35. 
183. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 15. 
184. See John H. Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, 98 PAST & PRESENT 96, 110 (1983) 
(stating that 1121 people were convicted and sentenced to death between 1749-1771). 
185. See id. at 110 (accounting that from 1749-1771, out of the 1121 convicts sentenced 
to death, 443 convicts were reprieved or died in prison, and of the 443 who were reprieved, 
401 were pardoned for transportation); see also LEON RADZINOWICZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR 
REFORM 157-58 (1948) (estimating that from 1710-1714, only 35 percent of those capitally 
convicted in London were actually executed). 
186. Langbein, supra note 184, at 110 (stating that 401 of the 443 who escaped execu-
tion were pardoned). 
187. See id. at 110-13 (discussing the factors considered before executing a convict). 
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the benefit of the clergy,188 judges applying the in favorem vitae 
doctrine would construe indictments, pleadings, statutes, and 
procedural rules "literally and strictly" in order to avoid imposing 
the statutorily required death sentence.189 
English common law reserved capital punishment for a few 
crimes-treason, murder, rape, and arson.190 From the Middle 
Ages to the eighteenth century, defendants facing capital pu-
nishment could invoke the privilegii clericalis, "the benefit of the 
clergy."191 Originally, only actual members of the clergy could 
claim the privilege, which entitled clerics to have their cases re-
moved from the jurisdiction of common law courts to ecclesiastical 
courts. 192 By the fourteenth century, literate non-clerics could also 
claim the privilege.193 By the fifteenth century, the privilege had 
evolved so that defendants could only claim it postconviction.194 
Beginning in the sixteenth century, Parliament attempted to 
curb the use of the privilege by requiring defendants who had in-
voked it to have their thumbs branded.195 For capital defendants 
who could claim clergy, a death sentence was commuted to a 
seven-year term of indentured servitude in the British colonies.196 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, not alone in his disapproval of the 
clergy privilege, critically referred to it as "a promiscuous but ab-
surd and capricious mitigation of the cruel severity of the com-
mon law."197 Thus, by the eighteenth century, Parliament widely 
188. In priuilegii clericalis began as an ecclesiastical privilege that exempted members 
of the clergy from criminal trial in secular courts, but it evolved into a jurisprudence in 
secular court of offering leniency, first for clergymen, and later for the literate. See J.H. 
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 513-15 (4th ed. 2002). By the six-
teenth century, it had become a doctrine of leniency for fIrst-time offenders. See 4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *358--t>7. 
189. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 17. 
190. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 4. 
191. Id. at 3 & n.2. 
192. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *358, *361. 
193. SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF 
ENGLAND 35 (2d ed. 1890). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 36. ''Under Edward VI clergy was taken from murder, burglary, house-
breaking, and putting the inhabitants in fear, highway robbery, horse-stealing, and rob-
bing churches. Under Elizabeth, stealing from the person, amounting to grand larceny, 
and rape and burglary in 1576, were excluded from clergy." Id. (citations omitted). 
196. Langbein, supra note 184, at 117. 
197. STEPHEN, supra note 193, at 35. For a discussion of the history and evolution of 
the benefIt ofthe clergy, see supra note 188. 
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enacted statutes restricting the use of the privilege to a few li-
mited crimes. 19B 
In England, between 1688 and 1823, the number of capital 
crimes grew four-fold. 199 In favorem vitae grew increasingly popu-
lar as the clergy privilege waned in use.200 As early as the seven-
teenth century, Sir Matthew Hale noted that "where any sta-
tute ... hath ousted clergy in any of those felonies, it is only so 
far ousted, and only in such cases and as to such persons as are 
expressly comprised within such statutes, for in favorem vitae & 
privilegii clerical is such statutes are construed literally and 
strictly."20I Strict interpretation of statutes required judges, when 
confronted with ambiguous statutes, to resolve the ambiguity in 
favor of the accused.202 
Essentially, in favorem vitae demanded that capital statutes be 
applied with a rigid, technical conformity to pleading and proof, 
resulting in a disparity between the laws as written and as ap-
plied.203 Radzinowicz noted that even though the number of capi-
tal offenses was "large and growing," the number of executions 
rapidly declined, and attributed this discrepancy to the "diver-
gence between the policy of the Legislature, which was to main-
tain and even to increase the number of capital statutes, and the 
attitude of those who were called upon to put the law into opera-
tion."204 
In favorem vitae reached its heyday in eighteenth-century Eng-
land, which bore witness to the exponential growth in capital sta-
198. BAKER, supra note 188, at 515 & n.82; RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 3 & n.2; 
Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 517 & n.40 
(2002) (discussing how statutes retracting benefit of clergy were essentially death penal-
ties). 
199. See RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 611-59 (offering a complete list of eighteenth 
century capital statutes in England). 
200. See 2 HALE, supra note 35, at 335; see also 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF 
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 188 (8th ed. 1824) (agreeing that the "settled rule [is] that all 
statutes are to be construed strictly in favour oflife"). 
201. 2 HALE, supra note 35, at 335. 
202. See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. 
REV. 748,751-52, 756-61 (1935) (discussing the history of strict interpretation of statutes 
and advocating its death); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construc-
tion of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 189 (1985) (proposing that the rule of strict con-
struction is "defunct"). 
203. See RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 158. 
204. Id. 
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tutes that prohibited the clergy privilege.205 In his Commentaries, 
published in the 1760s, Blackstone tallied the number of capital 
statutes at 160.206 While some of these capital statutes punished 
serious crimes like murder, piracy, and arson, most imposed 
death for property crimes, which today would be considered mi-
nor, such as grand larceny (defined at the time as the theft of 
goods over twelve pence), burglary, bankruptcy, forgery, and em-
bezzlement.207 It was into this atmosphere of severe punishments 
for petty crimes that the concept of in favorem vitae was widely 
invoked.208 
While conceding that English judges resorted to stringent re-
quirements and strained interpretations out of necessity and 
from mercy, scholars nonetheless criticized the use of in favorem 
vitae. 209 Radzinowicz disapproved of the practice, commenting 
that "[w]hen in a case tried under a capital statute the court felt 
that it would be unjust to inflict the appointed penalty, it applied 
any technique by which it could be evaded."210 Hale, while ac-
knowledging "[t]he strictness required in indictments is great, be-
cause life is in question,"211 disparaged the use of in favorem vitae 
205. Id. at 4; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *18. 
206. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *18 ("It is a melancholy truth, that among the 
variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less than an hundred and sixty 
have been declared by act of parliament to be felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other 
words, to be worthy of instant death."). 
207. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 620-59. The overwhelming majority of offenders 
were executed for having committed property crimes. 
Out of 678 offenders executed in London and Middlesex in the twenty-three 
years from 1749 to 1771, seventy·two had committed murder, fifteen at-
tempted murder, two rape, two sodomy, one high treason, and two other felo-
nies. Thus out of 678 capital sentences for which executions took place, only 
ninety-four were for very serious crimes against the person and the State; all 
the remaining 584 were for offences against property. 
Id. at 148. 
208. See HAWKINS, supra note 200, at 188. 
209. See Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 17. 
Id. 
The consensus view among scholars is that the hypertechnicality of the Eng. 
lish courts' interpretations, although purporting to adhere strictly to the 
laws, in fact masked an instrumentalist approach that-while understanda-
ble from the perspective of the moral merits of the cases (which often involved 
petty theft crimes)-ill-served the greater cause of the rule oflaw. 
210. RADZINowICZ, supra note 185, at 87. 
211. 2 HALE, supra note 35, at 168. 
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as "a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the administra-
tion thereof; more offenders escape by the over easy ear given to 
exceptions in indictments, than by their own innocence."212 
B. Capital Punishment in the American Colonies and in 
Nineteenth Century America 
While American colonists imposed the death penalty to a lesser 
extent than their English contemporaries,2J3 capital punishment 
has existed in the United States since the country's inception.214 
Initially, Northern colonists did not punish property crimes like 
burglary and robbery with death, but they did impose the death 
penalty for morality offenses, such as blasphemy, adultery, and 
bestiality.2J5 Because of their dependence on agriculture, Southern 
colonists imposed death for minor property crimes, such as em-
bezzling tobacco and stealing livestock.216 
While the number of capital statutes in the United States in-
creased in the eighteenth century,2J7 it never came close to top-
ping the number of English capital statutes.2J8 Because not as 
many crimes were punishable by death, the American judiciary 
did not have as much occasion to employ in favorem vitae. Never-
theless, the concept was firmly recognized and has been applied 
since the country's founding. 219 
Capital cases from the early nineteenth century remained 
faithful to English procedural rules and judges construed rules 
narrowly and in favor of the defendant. 22o That capital defendants 
212. Id. at 193. 
213. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY &--7 (2002). 
214. See id. at 5-9. 
215. See id. at 6. 
216. See id. at 8. 
217. See id. at 7-8. 
218. See id. at 7. 
219. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 14-15. The doctrine was first invoked in State u. 
Briggs, decided in 1794, where the Constitutional Court of Appeals of South Carolina re-
jected a horse thiefs in fauorem uitae argument that he was entitled to an extra day to 
prepare for trial. 3 S.C.L. 8, 1 Brev. *8 (S.C. Eq. 1794), ouerruled by State v. Torrence, 406 
S.E.2d 315, 324, 328 n.5 (S.C. 1991). At the time, horse-stealing was punishable by death. 
BANNER, supra note 213, at 140. 
220. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 633-34 (1818) (noting that 
the defendants had been indicted for the capital crime of piracy, and interpreting the anti-
piracy statute to protect only crimes against U.S. citizens, resulting in a sentence other 
than death); United States v. Venable, 28 F. Cas. 368, 368 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 16,615) 
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received special treatment was deeply ingrained in the minds of 
early American jurists. In United States v. Wood, where a defen-
dant faced both capital and noncapital charges for armed robbery 
of the mail, the prosecutor admitted that "whether the [capital] 
counts were proved would depend upon the meaning [of] the word 
'jeopardy,"' and noted that since "[t]he word is doubtful and the 
case is capital" he would not "press that part of the case which 
calls for the offender's life."221 
American judges often exercised their discretion in favorem vi-
tae to afford capital defendants special consideration, such as se-
vering joint indictments222 and granting a new trial because the 
original judge died right before he was about to deliver his opi-
nion on a murder convict's motion for a new tria}.223 Of course, 
capital defendants did not always receive preferential treatment. 
For example, in United States v. Perez, without obtaining the cap-
ital defendant's consent, the court discharged the jury because it 
failed to agree on a verdict. 224 The Supreme Court of the United 
States held that judges have the discretion to declare mistrials; 
thus, discharging the jury without the defendant's consent would 
not bar a future tria}.225 Writing for the Court, Justice Story 
stated, "To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest 
caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and ob-
vious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts should be ex-
tremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, 
in favour of the prisoner."226 
(instructing the jury to apply a statute narrowly, which resulted in the acquittal of a de· 
fendantwho had been indicted for the capital crime of passing counterfeited coin). 
221. 28 F. Cas. 755, 759 (C.C.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 16,757). Despite the prosecutor's con· 
cession, the trial judge instructed the jury to adopt the broader definition of "jeopardy" and 
the jury ultimately found the defendant guilty of the capital offense. Id. at 759-60. The 
appellate court, however, arrested the judgment because the indictment had not alleged 
that the trial court had jurisdiction, and as the case was capital, it should have been tried 
where the offense had been committed. Id. at 761. 
222. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 26 F. Cas. 1205, 1206 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1846) 
(No. 15,746). 
223. See, e.g., United States v. Harding, 26 F. Cas. 131, 133, 136 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846) 
(No. 15,301). 
224. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 579 (1824). 
225. Id. at 579-80. 
226. Id. at 580. Justice Story may be the most prolific jurist on the in favorem vitae 
doctrine. While he criticized "its excesses," he also maintained that "capital defendants 
deserved special procedural considerations 'in favor of life' in appropriate cases-
particularly with respect to discretionary issues and close interpretations of statutes." 
Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 18, 22 nn.43-44 (setting out a detailed history of Justice 
996 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:961 
Early on, American judges recognized that the evidence re-
quired to convict a capital defendant must be strong. 227 Trial 
courts often articulated the burden of proof in criminal cases-
beyond a reasonable doubt-in terms of the in favorem vitae doc-
trine. 228 When confronted with the issues of peremptory chal-
lenges, motions for separate trials, and motions for new trial, 
while judges did not always grant capital defendants' request, 
they often invoked in favorem vitae to justify their decisions. 229 
C. In Favorem Vitae in Twentieth Century America 
American courts in the twentieth century continued to depart 
from English rules of procedure. By the twentieth century, in fa-
vorem vitae had evolved into a catch-all phrase for exercising 
judicial discretion in favor of capital defendants. 23o Some courts 
independently searched trial records for unpreserved error/3l 
Story's in favorem vitae opinions). His language was often full of compassion: "In a capital 
cause, every motive of humanity and justice, combining with the precepts of the law, 
would compel me to postpone a decision until all such doubts were dissipated. I never will 
be instrumental in taking away life, until I am clearly persuaded that the law imposes 
upon me this painful and melancholy duty." United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 652 
(C.C.D.R.1. 1820) (No. 14,868). 
227. See, e.g., United States v. Vanranst, 28 F. Cas. 360, 360 (C.C.D. Pa. 1812) (No. 
16,608) ("In any case, more particularly in one that is capital, the circumstances relied 
upon to establish the guilt of the accused, ought to be strong, so as to leave no doubt of the 
fact; and they should be consistent with themselves, each circumstance tending to estab-
lish the guilt of the party."). 
228. See, e.g., Neal v. Fesperman, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 416, 417 (1854) (''Where the evi-
dence is circumstantial it is admitted to be proper, 'in favorem vitae,' for the Court to in-
struct the jury that if there be any hypothesis consistent with the prisoner's innocence 
they should find for him 'not guilty'-that is, if the circumstances proven may all be true, 
and still the prisoner be not guilty, they should acquit."); State v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224, 
230 (1861), overruled by Novosel v. Helgemoe, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (N.H. 1978) ("A system of 
rules, therefore, by which the burden is shifted upon the accused of showing any of the 
substantial allegations in the indictment to be untrue, or, in other words, to prove a nega-
tive, is purely artificial and formal, and utterly at war with the humane principle which, 
in favorem vitae, requires the guilt of the prisoner to be established beyond reasonable 
doubt."). 
229. See, e.g., United States v. White, 28 F. Cas. 580, 580, 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 
16,682). Where two defendants had been indicted for murder on the high seas and one de-
fendant moved for separate trials, the court overruled the defendant's motion, reasoning, 
"[i]n capital cases it is always the desire of the court to grant every reasonable favor to the 
prisoners; but it is, at the same time, its duty to allow the government its fair and regular 
claims." Id. at 580. 
230. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. 
231. See, e.g., State v. Young, 51 A. 939, 941 (N.J. 1902) (''We have deemed it proper, in 
favorem vitae, to assume, without deciding, that under the present legislation an excep-
tion duly taken to the admission of a confession in evidence may raise the question wheth-
er the conclusions of fact whereon the trial court acted were justified by the evidence taken 
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while other courts continued to recognize that capital defendants 
deserved special procedural accommodations.232 In Andres v. Unit-
ed States, the trial judge issued ambiguous jury instructions re-
garding the mitigation of a defendant's death sentence to life im-
prisonment.233 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed 
and remanded a lower court's death sentence, stating, "In death 
cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in 
favor of the accused."234 
Modern application of in favorem vitae is best exemplified by 
the approach of the South Carolina judiciary, which afforded cap-
ital defendants heightened appellate review. 235 In favorem vitae 
thus became synonymous with an appellate court's independent 
review of the record in death penalty cases to search for legal er-
rors not properly preserved.236 In State v. Swilling, the court 
stated, "In keeping with ... in favorem vitae, we have not only 
considered the exceptions on appeal and the questions briefed 
and orally argued ... , but we have also independently searched 
the record for prejudicial error, whether or not objected to below 
or made a ground of exception here."237 South Carolina abrogated 
its use of in favorem vitae in State v. Torrence, where it accepted 
the state's argument that "historical and legal developments have 
rendered in favorem vitae obsolete."238 
in the preliminary examination in that court."). 
232. See, e.g., Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1940) (presuming, in fa-
vorem vitae, that the defendant must have consented to a new trial since he had been 
"condemned to death and might be helped and could not possibly be hurt by a new trial 
.... "). 
233. 163 F.2d 468,469 (9th Cir. 1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 740 (1948). 
234. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948). 
235. See John H. Blume & Pamela A Wilkins, Death by Default: State Procedural De-
fault Doctrine in Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (1998) (discussing the history of 
in favorem vitae review in South Carolina and its abolition). 
236. See State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 319 (S.C. 1991). 
237. 142 S.E.2d 864, 865 (S.C. 1965), overruled by Torrence, 406 S.E.2d at 328 & n.5. 
238. 406 S.E.2d at 319. Justice Chandler argued that since other mechanisms afforded 
protection and postconviction relief to those capitally convicted, in favorem vitae review 
was no longer necessary to safeguard capital defendants. [d. at 321-23 (Chandler, J., con-
curring). 
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Since 1354, English law has recognized that individuals sen-
tenced to death must be afforded due process of the law.239 The 
framers of the Bill of Rights incorporated the same principle into 
the Fifth Amendment, which states that "[n]o person shall be 
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... "240 
The bulk of contemporary capital punishment jurisprudence is 
centered on the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Pu-
nishments Clause.241 However, scholars have argued that the 
Court should use the Due Process Clause to establish "minimal 
procedures that should underlie all capital sentencing proceed-
ings,"242 reasoning that the Due Process Clause better ensures re-
liability in capital sentencing than the Cruel and Unusual Pu-
nishments Clause.243 While federal courts rarely invoke the Due 
Process Clause when discussing capital punishment, they have 
done so on several occasions.244 The Supreme Court has held that 
due process requires that those on trial for their lives be provided 
239. See John Baker, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Renaissance England, 2 
Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 1, 11 & n.57 (2004) ("Item qe nul homme, de quel estate ou condi-
tion qil soit, ne soit oste de terre ne de tenement, ne pris, nemprisone, ne disherite, ne mis 
a mort, saunz estre mesne en respons par due proces de lei," which may be translated 
thus: ''No Man, of whatever estate or condition, shall be put out from land or tenement, 
taken or imprisoned, disinherited, or put to death, without being brought to answer by due 
process of the law." (citing 28 Edward III, c.3». 
240. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
241. See Brinkmann, supra note 180, at 360-62; see also Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 
16. 
242. Brinkmann, supra note 180, at 352. 
243. See id. at 367, 370, 373 (arguing that the Due Process Clause requires courts to 
presume a defendant facing capital punishment deserves a life sentence to ensure that 
death is not imposed in violation of the Constitution and to place the burden on the prose-
cution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the only appropriate penalty); 
Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 16-17; Joshua Herman, Comment, Death Denies Due 
Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges to the Federal Death Penalty Act, 53 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1777, 1777-78 (2004) (discussing United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002), and United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 
2d 469 (D. Vt. 2002), rev'd, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004), which challenged the constitutio-
nality of the Federal Death Penalty Act using due process arguments). 
244. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158, 162, 168--73 (1975); Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932). 
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with the aid of counsel when desired.245 The Court has vacated a 
death sentence, holding that a trial judge violated due process 
when, in deciding whether to impose the death sentence, he relied 
on a confidential presentence investigation report, portions of 
which were not disclosed to either the defendant or his counsel, 
such that the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain its 
contents.246 The Court has reversed a death sentence conviction, 
holding that while evidence in the record indicated that aggravat-
ing circumstances existed to justify a death sentence, the jury had 
not reached the same conclusion, and therefore the trial court vi-
olated the defendant's due process rights by imposing a death 
sentence.247 The Court reversed a capital conviction, reasoning 
that the trial court's exclusion of hearsay testimony during the 
punishment phase of the trial violated due process because that 
testimony was "highly relevant to a critical issue ... and substan-
tial reasons existed to assume its reliability."248 
In recent cases, the Court has demonstrated willingness to look 
at the constitutionality of due process issues based on how Eng-
lish common law treated the issues. 249 Looking to common law at 
the time of the founding reveals that those who could not under-
stand the fundamentals of trial were not forced to participate in 
trials where they might receive a death sentence.250 Blackstone 
commented, "[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital 
offence, ... [a]nd if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes 
mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence ?"251 
The decision of whether a man is competent to stand trial is one 
for the court, since the very act of putting an incompetent defen-
dant before jurors contradicts the core values of the criminal jus-
245. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68,72-73. In establishing the right to counsel in a capital case, 
the Court in Powell surveyed legal history and pointed to the right to counsel in capital 
cases in the colonial legislatures. Id. at 61-63, 65, 68. As Adam Thurschwell has argued, 
"the First Congress provided for appointment of counsel for capital defendants in the same 
act that authorized capital punishment, making no similar provision for non·capital de· 
fendants for almost another century." Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 14 n.3 (citing Mal· 
lard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 306 (1989». 
246. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977). 
247. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 15-17 (1978). 
248. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 (1979) (citations omitted). 
249. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 47~1 (2000); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 
639 (1990); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356-60 (1996); Thurschwell, supra 
note 23, at 15-17. 
250. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24; see also Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 
17. 
251. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *1440-42. 
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tice system. The fundamental protection of the right to due 
process is a determination that being made to stand trial is fair. 
A mentally retarded defendant who is susceptible to trial prob-
lems, such as an inability to assist counselor serve as a useful 
witness for the defense, as well as to sentencing problems, such 
as a jury's disregard for mental retardation as a mitigating factor, 
is incapable of participating in a fair trial.252 
Before the trial begins, the trial court owes each capital defen-
dant a determination of the mental retardation issue, and em-
ploying the in favorem vitae doctrine would ensure that due 
process is not offended. Moreover, this call for a unified compe-
tency assessment, reviewed in favorem vitae, is consistent with 
the Court's trend to exempt those defendants who are incompe-
tent to be executed from the death-eligible tria1.253 
v. THE TWO-EDGED SWORD OF MENTAL RETARDATION 
The Supreme Court's decision to categorically exclude mentally 
retarded defendants from the imposition of a death sentence 
marked a shift from its earlier jurisprudence whereby mental re-
tardation was a mitigating factor to be considered by the jury at 
sentencing.254 The Court recognized that "mental retardation as a 
mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the 
likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness 
will be found by the jury."255 Because categorical exclusion is the 
Court's mandate in Atkins, the mentally retarded defendant de-
serves protection from "the two-edged sword."256 By creating a 
new constitutional right-the Eighth Amendment right for men-
tally retarded defendants to be categorically excluded from the 
imposition of a death sentence-the Court necessitates imple-
mentation of a procedure that will guarantee due process to pro-
tect the defendant's Eighth Amendment right. An examination of 
252. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318, 320-21 (2002). 
253. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954, 962 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 571, 578-79 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21. 
254. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding mentally retarded defendants are cate· 
gorically excluded from execution), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) 
("[M]ental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a defendant's culpability for a capi-
tal offense. But we cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the ex· 
ecution of any mentally retarded person .... "). 
255. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 324). 
256. Id. 
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the role of the death-qualified juror and of the capital prosecutor 
reveals that neither is capable of setting aside bias and complying 
with the Court's directive in Atkins. 
A. Witherspoon Jurors 
The death-qualified jury, like any other criminal jury, is com-
prised of ordinary people with no special expertise. While crimi-
nal trials often involve gruesome, difficult stories, the capital jury 
is guaranteed to deal with challenging emotions and facts, and 
must further grapple with complex instructions on the law.257 To-
tal impartiality is impossible for any juror, and reliable studies 
show that jurors resort to arbitrary factors, such as race and reli-
gion, when choosing to impose a death sentence.258 Thirty-five 
years after Furman v. Georgia, the possible reasons a jury may 
impose a death sentence are about as predictable as being "struck 
by lightning."259 An arbitrary death sentence would constitute a 
due process violation. 
The duty of the capital jury is two-fold, deciding the guilt-
innocence phase and deciding the life-death phase, as all capital 
trials have a bifurcated sentencing event.260 Prosecutors may 
preemptively remove potential jurors who "would automatically 
vote against the imposition of capital punishment."261 Any other 
rule could result in a jury that has members who are categorically 
biased against death, making it impossible for a prosecutor to se-
cure a death sentence even in a fitting case. Mter the prosecution 
preemptively strikes any potential juror who forecloses the possi-
bility of a death sentence, the remaining potential jurors are often 
white, male, protestant, and less educated than the overall jury 
257. Jose Felipe Anderson, When the Wall Has Fallen: Decades of Failure in the Super· 
vision of Capital Juries, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 741, 750 (2000). 
258. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview 
of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1070--71 (1995); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Dead· 
ly Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 380--87 (2001). Almost eighty percent 
of all executions have taken place in former slave states, and black defendants are sen· 
tenced to death at a disproportionately higher rate than their white cellmates. See Facts 
About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/documentslFactSheet.pdf. See generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. & 
AUSTIN SARAT, Introduction to FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006). 
259. 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
260. Witherspoon v. illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968). 
261. Id. at 522 n.21. 
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pool which included those who would not impose a death sen-
tence.262 Death-qualified, or Witherspoon, jurors are more likely to 
defer to and trust prosecutors, are less likely to feel sympathy for 
the defendant, and are generally more prone to convicting in all 
criminal cases.263 When charged with determining whether a capi-
tal defendant is mentally retarded or not, death-qualified jurors 
are more likely to disregard or misunderstand expert psychiatric 
testimony.264 Scholars have begun to focus on how prosecutors can 
abuse the death-qualifying voir dire process to select the jury 
most likely to convict the defendant. 265 Capital defenders have de-
veloped a system for selecting the jurors least likely to fit the 
classic Witherspoon profile.266 
With no other feasible option, the Court has held that, even 
though it allows for bias, the death-qualifying voir dire practice is 
constitutional; the Court has never mandated that the same jury 
hear both phases of the capital tria}.267 Trial courts have at-
tempted to craft proceedings that do not force the capital defen-
dant to appear before a jury predisposed to convict, to trust the 
prosecution's evidence, and to doubt the defendant's evidence.26B 
But in most states, the capital defendant will appear before the 
262. See Brooke Bulter & Adina W. Wasserman, The Role of Death Qualification in Ve· 
nirepersons' Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1744, 
1745-46 (2006) (describing death· qualification status frequency among different demo· 
graphic and attitudinal groups); Joseph Carroll, Gallup Poll: Who Supports the Death Pe· 
nalty?, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
gallup·poll-who·supports·death·penalty (finding that the demographic most likely to be 
seated as a death·qualified jury is the same demographic most inclined to impose a death 
sentence). 
263. See, e.g., Claudia L. Cowan et aI., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' 
Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 53,55 
67-68, 73-75 (1984); James R.P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, Stuck in the Dark Ages: Su-
preme Court Decision Making and Legal Developments, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 379, 
391 (2004). 
264. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries 
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109,1185-86 (1997). 
265. For example, in choosing to pursue its capital charge against Andrea Yates, the 
mother charged with drowning her children, critics opined that the prosecution merely 
wanted to selected a death· qualified jury, which would be less likely to accept her insanity 
defense. In the first trial, the prosecutors were right. See Lisa Teachey, DA Will Seek to 
Put Yates on Death Row/Mom Pleads Insanity in Children's Drowning, Hous. CHRON., 
Aug. 9, 2001, at AI. 
266. See Matthew Rubenstein, Overview of the Colorado Method in Capital Voir Dire, 
CHAMPION, Nov. 2010, at 18. 
267. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170 n.7, 181 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1985). 
268. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 311, 331 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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same death-qualified jury to argue both the guilt-innocence and 
life-death phases of the triaP69 
As a general matter, death-qualified jurors are hostile to men-
tal health testimony, defenses, and mitigation; "[f]urther, death-
qualified jurors more willingly accept aggravating circumstances 
than mitigating factors-many of which involve mental health is-
sues."270 Scholars have long argued that the biases of the death-
qualified jury violate due process, especially given the empirical 
evidence that those jurors will reject credible evidence of affirma-
tive defenses, such as insanity.271 It is a reasonable inference that 
death-qualified jurors will disregard credible, empirical evidence 
of mental retardation.272 
As a solution to the well-recognized problem of death-qualified 
juror nullification on credible mental health defenses, scholars fo-
cus on how to pick the best jurors out of the biased jury pool.273 
But the mental retardation determination, in the context of 
Atkins, could and should be made by the trial court. Unlike the 
insanity defense, which is inextricably intertwined with the evi-
dence of guilt,274 the categorical exemption from execution guar-
anteed by Atkins should not be considered along with facts estab-
lishing guilt or future dangerousness. If the death-qualified jury 
269. See, e.g., Brook A. Thompson, Criminal Law-The Supreme Court Expands the 
Witt Principles to Exclude a Juror Who Would Follow the Law. Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. 
Ct. 2218 (2007), 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 845, 854 (2008) (detailing states that 
enacted a guided jury sentencing scheme in which the same jury decides both the defen-
dant's guilt and sentence, but in two different trials); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 420 U.S. 
153, 160, 207 (1975) (upholding a Georgia statutory system in which guilt and sentence 
are determined by the same jury at two different trials). 
270. Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for the 
Mentally Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 
712 (2008) (citing James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Ju-
rors'Responses to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAw & 
HUM. BEHAV. 263, 279 (1988». 
271. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth et aI., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of 
Insanity, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 81, 89-90 (1984); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw 
& HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46-48 (1984). 
272. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
273. See, e.g., Ellsworth et aI., supra note 271, at 91-92. 
274. When determining whether a defendant was insane at the time of the offense, the 
jury will weigh medical testimony of the defendant's mental illness with conduct evidence, 
such as the defendant's "ability ... to devise and execute a deliberate plan," the way the 
defendant appeared to lay observers at the time of the crime, and how the defendant ap-
peared to and acted toward the investigating police officers. People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959, 
965 (Cal. 1964). 
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is unable to resist seeing mental retardation as "a loophole allow-
ing too many guilty people to go free,"275 then, to preserve the due 
process guarantee, the trial court must step in to make the fac-
tual determination that will result in the categorical exemption 
from death. 
The unified competency assessment serves a purpose without 
undermining the role of the jury in capital cases.276 Even the best-
informed capital juror would likely be confused by how he should 
assess the evidence of mental retardation against evidence of ag-
gravating factors of future dangerousness. The Atkins Court de-
tailed that its Penry rule had been a failure because it left to the 
death-qualified jury the task of sorting out whether mental retar-
dation should be a mitigating factor or an aggravating factor.277 
The Court's own justification for its categorical exemption of 
the mentally retarded from a death sentence is convoluted and 
mixes issues of culpability, diminished capacity, and ability to 
perform and assist at trial.278 Given the mentally retarded defen-
dant's unique inability to perform at trial and jurors' likelihood to 
view the mental retardation diagnosis as an insufficient excuse,279 
the net result will be the jury disagreeing with the Court's con-
clusion that diminished capacity equates to diminished culpabili-
ty. And, as with Atkins himself, the jury could hear overwhelm-
ing evidence of mental retardation and simply disregard it, and 
sentence the defendant to death. 280 That result, post-Atkins, vi-
olates the Eighth Amendment.281 And the process that allowed the 
jury to reach a verdict that violated the Eighth Amendment itself 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.282 
275. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 271, at 45. 
276. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604 (2002). When the Court extended its rule 
from Apprendi to capital cases, it held that the jury must determine the aggravating fac-
tors before the defendant could be sentenced to death. Id. at 588-89. The unified compe-
tency assessment theorized in this article does not interfere with the holding in Ring, 
since mental retardation should only be viewed as a mitigating factor by the sentencing 
jury. Ring does not demand that the jury must find mitigating factors. 
277. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
278. See id. at 306-07,320-21. 
279. Id. at 320-21. 
280. See id. at 310. 
281. Id. at 321. 
282. The Court deals with due process questions in the admissibility context, determin-
ing what kinds of evidence should be presented to the jury. See Simmons v. South Caroli-
na, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (reversing after the trial court denied the defendant's instruc-
tion on life without parole); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 8 (1986) (reversing 
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B. Prosecutors 
Prosecutors abuse their discretion when they choose to seek 
death in order to seat a death-disposed jury.283 "The duty of the 
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."284 Moreover, 
prosecutors should "seek to reform and improve the administra-
tion of criminal justice," and "must exercise sound discretion in 
the performance of [their] functions."285 One way that prosecutors 
could "seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal 
justice" would be to ask the trial court to make a pretrial deter-
mination of whether the capital defendant is mentally retarded 
and should be categorically excluded from a death sentence. 
Prosecutors should make an independent probable cause de-
termination before proceeding on any charges against the defen-
dant and should not pursue prosecution in cases where the evi-
dence is insufficient to support a conviction.28G In making the 
decision to pursue a charge, the prosecutor must consider his own 
"reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty."287 Thus, in 
the Atkins context, the prosecutor must consider his own reason-
able doubts about the capital defendant's "competency" for execu-
tion. 
The ABA's commentary on the special responsibilities of a 
prosecutor describes the prosecutor as a "minister of justice."288 
The first Oxford English Dictionary definition of "minister" is the 
most relevant: "[a] servant, attendant .... One who waits upon, 
or ministers to the wants of another."289 He is no mere advocate 
after the trial court denied the defendant the opportunity to present evidence of good be· 
havior in prison); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351, 362 (1977) (reversing after the 
trial court denied defendant the opportunity to review and rebut the contents of a presen-
tence investigation report). 
283. J. Amy Dillard, At His Discretion (N.): "To Be Disposed of as He Thinks Fit; At His 
Disposal, At His Mercy; Unconditionally, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1295, 1304-05 
(2007) (reviewing ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE (2007» (discussing the ability of 
prosecutors to obtain juries inclined to adopt the death penalty, and citing the Andrea 
Yates prosecution as a prime example). 
284. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993). 
285. Id. at 3-1.2(d), 3-1.2(b). 
286. Id. at 3-3.9(a). 
287. Id. at 3-3.9(b)(i). 
288. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983) (amended 2008). 
289. 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 817-18 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 
2d ed. 1989). 
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for his position, and the responsibility carries a specific obligation 
to see that each defendant "is accorded procedural justice, [and] 
that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence."29o Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun explicitly found that prosecutors could not 
shoulder this heavy burden in the death context: "Rather than 
continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of 
fairness has been achieved ... I feel morally and intellectually ob-
ligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has 
failed."291 
The prosecutor bears the sole responsibility for setting the 
death machine in motion, and in high profile capital cases, politi-
cal prosecutors are most susceptible to community pressure for 
revenge. 292 Federal prosecutors must work through a detailed re-
port before seeking death, including the preparation of a "Death 
Penalty Evaluation," vetted by the Attorney General.Z93 In making 
the determination of whether the decision to seek death is appro-
priate, the charging U.S. Attorney must weigh the mitigating fac-
tors against the aggravating factors.294 He may not ignore the fact 
of mental retardation; nor does this evaluative duty disappear 
once the decision is made.295 The prosecutor has a continuing re-
sponsibility to be a minister of justice. 296 
290. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983) (amended 2008). 
291. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from deni-
al of certiorari). 
292. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 
77-78, 85-89 (2007) (detailing the controlling power of prosecutors in capital cases as well 
as the experience of two black prosecutors who choose not be seek death in high-profile 
capital prosecutions). 
293. U.S. Attorney Manual, Capital Crimes, 9-10.040, 9-10.080, available at http://www 
.justice.gov/usao/eousalfoia_reading_roomlusamltitle9/10mcrm.htm. 
294. ld. at 9-1O.080(A)(5). 
295. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (2006). 
296. While the cost of prosecuting and defending a capital case should be irrelevant in 
a fair system, states may experience a "systemic breakdown in the public defender system" 
that may be leading to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to a speedy trial and the 
right to counsel. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009) (quoting 
State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Vt. 2008». Categorically excluding mentally re-
tarded defendants from capital trials where a death sentence is a possibility would dra-
matically reduce the cost of prosecution and defense, since neither side would need to pre-
pare a sentencing case, nor retain the traditional expert witnesses who testify during the 
sentencing phase. Determining Mental Retardation in Pennsylvania, THE STAND DOWN 
TEXAS PROJECT (Aug. 30, 2010), http://standdown.typepad.comlweblog/2010/08/determing-
mental-retardation-in-pennsylvania.html. In fact, many capital defendants who go to trial 
rather than entering a guilty plea do so to make an argument that the jury should spare 
their life, not to make a robust argument of innocence. Michael C. Dorf, Why Al Qaeda 
Conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui's Guilty Plea Probably Won't Save His Life, FrNDLAW 
2011] MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS 1007 
Presuming that a prosecutor charges capital murder when the 
facts alleged fit the statutory crime, the prosecutor must still dec-
lare whether he seeks death as a possible penalty or whether he 
will proceed with life without parole as the only sentencing option 
for the jury.297 It is in this continuing duty to evaluate whether 
death is an appropriate option that prosecutors bear the most 
burden. When the prosecutor learns that the capital defendant 
has significant mental deficiencies that may render him unsuita-
ble for execution under Atkins, the prosecutor should be "[a] ser-
vant ... who ... ministers to the wants of another."298 His own in-
terests aside, he must carry out his specific obligation to see that 
the defendant is not subjected to a penalty for which the defen-
dant is not suited. In the way that a prosecutor would abuse his 
discretion by seeking death against a juvenile post-Roper, so too 
does a prosecutor abuse his discretion when he seeks death 
against the mentally deficient defendant, post-Atkins. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the past thirty-five years the Supreme Court of the United 
States has fetishized procedural due process and theoretical juri-
sprudence in the guise of "evolving standards of decency," while 
wholly ignoring substantive due process in its review of capital 
cases. But the twenty-first century opinions, in the context of all 
of the Court's post-Furman cases, set the stage for a new method 
for determining adjudicative competence. Drawing on the histori-
cal approach to achieving substantive due process in criminal 
cases, trial courts could afford capital defendants a detailed, pre-
trial competency evaluation to assess their factual, rational, deci-
sional, and emotional ability to assist counsel, along with a men-
tal retardation determination. This honest assessment of whether 
a defendant is competent to be sentenced to death and executed 
would restore fairness to a process that is rife with bias at the 
hands of Witherspoon jurors. If the trial court determines that the 
defendant is incompetent and is unable to demonstrate a factual, 
rational, decisional, and emotional ability to assist counsel, the 
capital trial may not begin.299 If the trial court determines that 
(Apr. 27, 2005), http://writ.news.findlaw.comldorfl20050427.html. 
297. See U.S. Attorney Manual, supra note 293, at 9-10.080. 
298. 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 289, at 817-18. 
299. See David Freedman, When is a Capitally Charged Defendant Incompetent to 
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the defendant is mentally retarded, but is otherwise competent to 
stand trial, the capital trial may begin, but the court may not 
present the option of death to the jury. In essence, the capital tri-
al of a mentally retarded defendant proceeds like all other trials, 
with a guilt or innocence decision by the jury and with the court 
imposing the sentence. 
The unified competency assessment requires a contextual 
analysis to satisfy the due process requirement. Chief among the 
context factors is the inability of the mentally retarded defendant 
to escape the bias of the death-qualified jury. Moreover, if the ex-
ecution of a mentally retarded (or juvenile) defendant does not 
comport with the core values of the criminal justice system, nei-
ther does the mockery of a trial wherein those categorically ex-
empted defendants must struggle to fight for their lives. To truly 
accomplish an assessment worthy of constitutional due process, 
the trial court would need to view the competency assessment in 
favorem vitae-in favor of life. The marginal competency es-
poused by the Court in Drope simply has no place in capitalliti-
gation. The complexity of the bifurcated trial, the depth of the 
emotional issues that must be explored to adequately prepare any 
respectable mitigation case, the vexing issues of coping with Wi-
therspoon jurors, the need for a more clinical approach to assess-
ing mental retardation in order to satisfy the Court's desire for 
moral dignity, and the end of life issues that conflate with exist-
ing mental illness and death row syndrome to produce mad men 
taking the dead man's walk all compound to necessitate that trial 
courts should meet the task of making the competency determi-
nation with the fervor of a defense attorney trying to save his 
client's life. 
Stand Trial?, 32 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 127, 127-28 (2009). The determination of com· 
petency is a legal determination, and the Court has never delineated different levels of 
competency for different grades of offenses. An argument that the level of competency ne-
cessary to stand trial for capital murder is higher than the level necessary to stand trial 
for a misdemeanor or any other felony is the subject of a work-in-progress by the author. A 
key feature of support for this assertion is that state legislatures require trial counsel to 
be more competent to represent defendants charged with more serious crimes, and many 
states have special requirements for death-qualified trial, appellate, and habeas counsel. 
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B)(1) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (Repl. Vol. 
2008). 
